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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

the arrearage properly balances the states' interest in protecting their dependent citizens with the federal interest in facilitating debtor rehabilitation
and, accordingly, courts properly should allow debtors to include support
arrearages in Chapter 13 plans.10
RODNEY L. MOORE

IV.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The Constitutionalityof State Regulation
of Public Utility Holding Companies

All public utility companies possess two defining features-a general
public need for the services that the public utility company provides and2
technical characteristics that foster monopolistic practices.' Holding companies
fostered the initial expansion of public utility companies in the 1920's and
1930's by providing necessary capitalization and technology.' According to

108. See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text (discussing Code sections protecting
support claimants and facilitating debtor rehabilitation).
1. Note, Jurisdiction of State Regulatory Commissions Over Public Utility Holding
Company Diversification, 15 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 87, 89 n.12 (1983) (public utility companies
include railroads, -waterways, pipelines, cable television, telephone services, electric power,
natural gas, and sewage) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdiction].A public utility company provides
goods or services that consumers need on a continual basis. Id. at 89.
2. 6A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS § 2821 (1981). A holding
company is a corporation organized to hold the stock of another corporation. Id. The primary
characteristic of a holding company is the ownership of securities, which allows a holding
company to control or influence the policies or management of one or more operating companies.
Id.; see also North Am. Co. v. S.E.C., 327 U.S. 686, 701 (1945) (concentrated ownership of
securities by holding company is primary means of achieving control over another company);
D.W. HAWES, UTILrrY HOLDING COMPANIES § 1.01 (1985) (describing types of holding companies). Three general types of holding companies exist. HAWES, supra, at § 1.01. One type of
holding company controls numerous other companies through less than full ownership. Id. A
second type of holding company aims at separating operating companies for legislative or
administrative purposes. Id. A final type of holding company seeks to control regulated
companies in the hope of avoiding some or all of the regulations. Id.
3. See S. Doe. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 832-33 (1927) (summary of report by
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to United States Senate on financial and corporate aspects
of holding and operating companies of electric and gas utilities). The holding company structure
facilitated rapid development of public utility companies by improving technical facilities,
stimulating the entry of new capital into the industry and providing a ready means for bringing
together unconnected operations in an efficient manner at a reasonably low cost. Id.; see, e.g.,
Rrfcnm, INTEGRATION OF PuBLic UTILrrY HOLDING COMPANIES at 12 (1954) (holding companies
were beneficial in original development of public utilities); N. Buchanan, The Public Utility
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federal law, a public utility holding company is any company that directly
or indirectly owns or controls ten percent or more of the outstanding voting
securities of a public utility company. 4 The public utility holding company
structure ultimately fostered dangerous management practices, including
fraudulent and misleading accounting practices that threatened public utility
service to consumers and represented a risk to investors.' On the federal
Holding Company Problem, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 517, 518 (1937) (holding companies possess
power to determine financial and management policies of subsidiaries); Comment, Federal
Regulation of Holding Companies: The Public Utility Act of 1935, 45 YALE L.J. 468-73 (1936)
(holding companies, by providing means to centralize management, transformed public utility
industry from local business operating within limited area to interstate industry) [hereinafter
cited as FederalRegulation].See generally HAwEs, supra note 2, at §§ 2.02-2.03 (detailing rapid
expansion of public utility companies using holding companies during years 1866-1932).
4. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat.
803, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(b) (1982) (federal statute regulating public utility holding companies).
Under PUHCA, Congress defined a public utility as a company that owns or operates the
meaffs for distribution of electric energy for sale or a company that owns or operates the means
for distributing at retail natural or manufactured gas for power, heat or light. Id. at § 79b(a)(3)(5); see infra note 6-9 and accompanying text (discussing scope of federal regulation of public
utility holding companies). Under federal law, a company that owns or controls 10% or more
of a public utility is a public utility holding company. 15 U.S.C. § 79(b)(6) (1982).
5. See American Power Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 100-02 (1946) (dangers of public
utility holding companies include financially irresponsible management and unsound capital
structure); North Am. Co., 327 U.S. at 701 (public utility holding companies facilitate
gerrymandering in manner unrelated to economic or efficient control); S. Doc. No. 92, supra
note 3, at 842-82 (summary of FTC report to United States Senate detailing dangerous practices
inherent in public utility holding companies). The FTC found that public utility holding
companies pose the following threats to consumers: charging excessive fees to the public utility,
conducting misleading and fraudulent methods of accounting, retaining public utility revenue,
and engaging in pyramiding practices creating a fragile corporate structure. S. Doc. No. 92,
supra note 3, at 842-82. The FTC report linked a public utility holding company's use of
unsound business practices with threats to consumers' receipt of adequate and economical public
utility goods and services. Id. at 881-82. Public utility holding companies also threatened
investors' investments in public utility stock. Id. at 881. Public utility holding companies
facilitated a "pyramiding" of companies in which a holding company, though lacking complete
ownership, controlled a number of operating companies. Id. The pyramiding structure threatened
a shareholder's investment in a public utility company by permitting operating companies to
issue securities of a speculative nature, the valuation of which might misrepresent the true value
of the public utility company. Id. Furthermore, an investor might be unable to ascertain a
public utility company's actual value because the intercorporate relationships of public utility
holding companies facilitated misleading accounting practices. Id. at 884; see also M.E. PARRISH,
SECUuIlS REGULATIONS

AND THE

NEw DEAL 147 (1970). Public utility holding companies often

have charged their subsidiary public utility companies significant management fees and higher
interest rates than a public utility would pay absent the presence of a holding company. M.E.
PARRISH, supra, at 147. The public utility passes those fees on to consumers in the form of
increased rates. M.E. PARRISH, supra, at 147; 2 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION 507 (1969) (summary of abuses of public utility holding companies documented by
FTC); RITCHIE, supra note 3, at 11-14.
Beyond the dangers the FTC identified as inherent in public utility holding companies,
other disadvantages of public utility holding companies that commentators have identified and
discussed frequently include the following: diversity of risk, absentee ownership, shifting of
talented managerial staff to non-utility activities, complex corporate structure, fees extracted
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level, Congress enacted the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
(PUHCA) to eliminate the dangerous management practices inherent in the
public utility holding company structure. 6 The ultimate danger at which
Congress aimed PUHCA was the distinct possibility that holding company
ownership of public utilities would adversely affect service to ratepayers and
represent a risk to persons investing in public utility companies.7 Congress
in PUHCA empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
enforce the Act's provisions8 by disallowing a holding company's initial
acquisition of the securities of a public utility or ordering simplification of
a public utility holding company structure. 9
from the public utility and financial manipulation. RrrcmE, supra note 3, at 11-14. A public
utility holding company permits diversification into areas beyond the public utility industry,
creating an increased risk to investors. Id. at 11. Associated with diversification may be a
rechanneling of managerial talent away from the public utility company to nonutility companies,
which may not be in the best interests of the consumers of a public utility company's goods
and services. Id.; N. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 520. If a public utility company involves itself
in a debtor-creditor relationship with its holding company, the financial relationship often
harms the public utility company, and ultimately the consumer, because a public utility company
usually pays to its holding company a higher interest rate than if the public utility company did
not participate in a holding company structure. N. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 520; Federal
Regulation, supra note 3, at 478. Ultimately, a public utility company passes the higher interest
payments to its consumers in the form of increased rates. N. Buchanan, supra at 520; Federal
Regulation, supra note 3, at 478. Public utility holding companies often milk public utility
companies of the operating company's finances by employing deceptive financial and accounting
methods that harm consumers by increasing rates and that harm investors by not utilizing the
public utility company's funds for the benefit of the public utility company. FederalRegulation,
supra note 3, at 470; see Jurisdiction,supra note 1, at 95 n.41 (rechanneling of management
talent away from public utility companies harms consumers).
6. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803, 15
U.S.C. § 79-79z-6 (1982) (federal statute regulating public utility holding company formation
and continuing business); see supra note 5 and accompanying text (detailing dangers to
consumers and investors inherent in public utility holding companies).
7. S. Doc. No. 92, supra note 3, at 882. Congress recognized that a state might feel
inhibited in regulating the corporate structure of public utilities because of the interstate character
of public utility holding companies. Id. The effect would be to constrain a state's legitimate
regulation of a public utility's rates. Id. Thus, higher utility rates would result over which no
constraining element existed. Id. Congress, therefore, sought to limit increases in utility rates
that arose pursuant to the holding company structure in PUHCA. Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 79b(b) (1982) (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has sole
authority to declare company holding company or subsidiary company). Any holding company,
or company planning to become a holding company, must file a notification of registration as
a holding company with the SEC. Id. at § 79e. The registration is effective once the SEC
receives the notification of registration. Id. at § 79e(a). A registered holding company must file
a registration statement containing the corporations articles of incorporation, financial statements, balance sheets, accountants' statements, and any other documentation the SEC determines to be necessary to protect investors and consumers. Id. at § 79e(b); 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.101 - 210.12-29 (1985) (detailing form and content of financial statements to accompany
registration of public utility holding company); 17 C.F.R. §§ 259.01-259-501 (1985) (detailing
forms required for registration with SEC of public utility holding company).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 79i (1982). A registered holding company must obtain SEC approval
before the company acquires the securities of a public utility company. Id. Under PUHCA, a
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While PUHCA provides for extensive federal regulation of public utility
holding companies,' 0 Congress did not intend to usurp completely the states'
traditional power to regulate public utility companies." In fact, PUHCA
specifically acknowledges the significant role played by states in regulating

public utilities.' 2 In 1955, the Maryland legislature enacted the Public Service
Commission Law to regulate public utility companies.

created a Public Service Commission

(PSC)' 4 with

3

The Maryland statute

the power to regulate the

rates public utility companies charge customers,' 5 the power to require a

holding company's application for acquisition of the securities of a public utility must include
all the documents that the SEC determines are necessary for the SEC to decide whether the
transaction is in the public's best interest. Id. at § 79j(a). The SEC may prevent an acquisition
upon determining that the dangers arising from the overlapping corporate departments would
be detrimental to the public interest or to investors, that the fees paid by the holding company
in the acquisition of a public utility company's assets or securities are unfair or unrelated to
the true value of the assets or securities, or that the transaction would complicate unduly the
corporate structure of the holding company to the detriment of the public or investors. Id. at
§ 79j(b). Once a holding company structure exists, Congress, pursuant to PUHCA, authorizes
the SEC to order simplification of the holding company if unnecessary complexities exist that
serve no economic or social purpose. Id. at § 79k. The SEC must ascertain certain facts before
ordering the simplification of a public utility holding company. Id. at § 79k(b)(l). If the SEC
finds that individual public utility companies located in one state or adjacent states would
operate at a substantial economic loss absent the use of a holding company structure, and that
one large holding company would not hamper the efficiency of local management or the
effectiveness of local regulation, the SEC may find simplification to be unnecessary. Id.
10. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (detailing extent of federal regulation of
public utility holding companies).
11. See Jurisdiction,supra note I, at 116 n.168. The SEC noted that a major purpose of
PUHCA was to facilitate state regulation of state public utility companies. Jurisdiction,supra
note 1, at 116 n.168. The exemption of intrastate holding companies from SEC review presumes
that states regulate intrastate public utility holding companies. Id. at 116. The Supreme Court
has recognized for many, years that state regulation of local public utility companies is a
legitimate exercise of state police powers. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, H. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONA. LAW 389 (2d ed. 1978). The police power concept recognizes the right of state and local
government to pass legislation aimed at protecting the health, safety and welfare of the state's
citizens. Id.; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876) (states may regulate property when
property becomes clothed with public interest); Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983) (regulation of public utilities is one of state's most
important functions); see also Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Council on Water Co. Lands of
Conn., 453 F. Supp. 942, 954-55 (D. Conn. 1978) (state may impose regulations on public
utility companies that differ from regulations imposed on other private companies because
public utility company is public purpose entity franchised by state).
12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 79f(b), 79i(b), 79g(g), 79n(b) (1982). PUHCA acknowledges the role
of states in regulating public utility companies. Id. For example, if a state public service
commission approves a holding company's acquisition of the assets or securities of a public
utility company and all the public utility companies are organized intrastate, the SEC cannot
prohibit the transaction. Id. at § 79i(b).
13. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, §§ 1-107 (1980) (Maryland Public Service Commission
Law).

14. Id. at §§ 3, 5. The Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) consists of five
Maryland citizens that the governor of Maryland appoints. Id.
15. Id. at §§ 68-72a. Maryland law authorizes the Maryland PSC to approve public utility
company rates that are just and reasonable. Id. § 69(a). Under Maryland law just and reasonable
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public utility to continue providing service, the power to order a public
utility to discontinue service,' 6 and the authority to inspect the records of a
public utility.' 7 Section 24 of the Maryland statute deals with the PSC's
authority over the corporate structure of a Maryland public utility. 18 Under
section 24, a public utility company in Maryland may not, without prior
approval of the PSC, assign, lease, or transfer a public utility franchise,' 9
acquire the capital stock of another public service company, 20 or issue
securities. 21 Section 24 of the Maryland Public Service Commission Law also22
prohibits a holding company from acquiring a public utility company,
except in the case of an acquisition of a public utility by a holding company
already controlling a public utility company of the same class as the public
utility company subject to acquisition. 2 The effect of the exemption in
section 24(e) is that only a holding company that presently controls a public
utility company may acquire another public utility, subject to PSC approval. 24
In Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Hientz 21 (Baltimore Gas), the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined whether section
26
24(e) of the Maryland Public Service Commission Law was constitutional.
In Baltimore Gas, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) and
BGE Corporation (BGE CORP.) filed a joint petition with the Maryland
Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting authorization for the acquisition
by BGE CORP of all the stock of BG&E. 27 BG&E was a public utility

organized under Maryland law with its principal office in Baltimore City,
Maryland.2 8 BG&E supplied gas and electricity to customers in Baltimore
rates are rates that are consistent with the public good and yield reasonable operating income
to the public utility company. Id. The Maryland PSC may alter a public utility company's rate
structure after a hearing allowing concerned parties to voice views on proposed rate changes.
Id. at § 69B.
16. Id. at § 75. The Maryland PSC may require a public utility company to continue or
to discontinue providing services if that action is necessary for public convenience. Id.
17. Id. at § 63.
18. Id. at § 24; see infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (discussing § 24 of Maryland
Public Service Commission Law).
19. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(b)(1) (1982).
20. Id. at § 24(b)(2).
21. Id. at § 24(b)(5).
22. Id. at § 24(e). No holding company may acquire more than 10% of the stock of a
Maryland public utility company. Id. A holding company, however, may acquire more than
10% of a Maryland public utility company if the holding company takes the stock as collateral
security and the PSC approves the transaction. Id.
23. Id. The Maryland Public Service Commission Law classifies public utility companies
to be of the same class when the public utility companies are both common carrier companies,
gas companies, electric companies, steam heating companies, telephone companies, telegraph
companies, radio common carriers, water companies, or sewage disposal companies. Id. at §
2(0).
24. Id. at § 24(e).
25. 760 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 141 (1985).
26. Id. at 1413-27.
27. In re Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 74 Md. PSC 249, Case No. 7695 Order No. 66273
(July 1, 1983).
28. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Heintz, 760 F.2d 1408, 1411 (4th Cir. 1985).
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City. 29

Shareholders residing outside of Maryland owned 70% of BG&E's
outstanding shares.30 BGE CORP was a Maryland corporation formed
specifically to be the parent company to BG&E.3' The joint application filed
with the PSC proposed a share-for-share exchange of all outstanding stock
of BG&E for stock in BGE CORP. 2 The stated purpose for the reorganization was to separate the utility and nonutility divisions of BG&E, allowing
the nonutility division to diversify into activities free of PSC supervision." Pursuant to section 24(e) of article 78 of the Maryland Code, the PSC
refused the reorganization plan, stating that the proposed plan violated
section 24(e), because, under the plan, BGE CORP would acquire control
of a Maryland public utility company, and BGE CORP was a stock corporation not already owning a public service company of the same class as
34
BG&E.
BG&E and BGE CORP brought an action against the Maryland PSC in
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland seeking a
declaratory judgment that section 24(e) of article 78 of the Maryland Code
was unconstitutional. 5 BG&E and BGE CORP first claimed that pursuant
to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, 6 the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 preempted section 24(e) of the Maryland

29. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1411 (1985).
30. Id. at 1411-12; see infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text (that 70% of BG&E's
shareholders were not residents of Maryland affects determination of whether Maryland statute
violates commerce clause).
31. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1412.
32. Id. The terms of the proposed acquisition by BGE CORP. of Baltimore Gas & Electric
Co. (BG&E) provided that BGE CORP. would acquire the stock of Resource & Property
Management (RPM), a wholly-owned subsidiary of BG&E. Id. As a result of the BGE CORP.'s
acquisition of BG&E and RPM, BG&E and RPM would have become separate, wholly owned
subsidiaries of BGE CORP., and holders of BG&E common stock would have become holders
of BGE CORP. common stock. Id. In share-for-share exchange of stock, the acquiring
corporation trades its shares for the shares of the acquired corporation. 13 Fox, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS-CoRPORATE AcQUISITIONS AND MERGERS § 3.03[2] (1984). Pursuant to a sharefor-share exchange of stock, a parent-subsidiary relationship exists in which the acquired
company, although now a subsidiary of the acquiring company, retains its identity. Id.
33. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Heintz, 582 F. Supp. 675, 677 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd.,
760 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1985). The jurisdiction and powers of the Maryland PSC extend only
to public utility companies operating a utility business in Maryland. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78,
§ 1 (1980). Thus, a public utility holding company can diversify into nonutility industries that
are beyond PSC control. Id.
34. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1412; MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(e) (1980).
35. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Heintz, 582 F. Supp. 675 (D. Md. 1984). By seeking
declaratory judgment in a federal court, BG&E bypassed the provisions of Maryland law for
direct state court review of a state administrative agency's action. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, §§
89-98 (1980) (Maryland provisions for judicial review of PSC action); see infra note 71 and
accompanying text (discussing Maryland provisions for direct state court review of state agency's
action).
36. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. The supremacy clause declares that congressional laws
enacted pursuant to the United States Constitution are superior to all state laws. Id.; see
generally J. NowAK, supra note 11, at 267-70 (discussing supremacy clause).
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3
Code. 7 The district court held that PUHCA did not preempt state law.
According to the district court, a federal law preempts state law to the extent
that the state's law blocks the achievement of the objectives of Congress.39
The district court found that Congress enacted PUHCA to control the
expansion of public utility holding companies and not to foster holding
companies. 40 The district court, therefore, found section 24(e)'s prohibition
against a holding company acquisition of a public utility, unless the holding
company already controlled a public utility, was not contrary to the objectives
of PUHCA.4 ' In addition to the claim that PUHCA preempted the Maryland
statute, BG&E claimed that section 24(e) violated the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution. 42 The district court found that Maryland had
a legitimate interest in controlling the formation of public utility holding
companies, but found that an outright prohibition on the formation of
holding companies served no legitimate state interest, because the state had
available less restrictive means to protect the public against the evils of public
utility companies. 4 3 The district court found that the burden section 24(e)
imposed on interstate commerce was excessive in light of the availability of

37. Baltimore Gas, 582 F. Supp. 680-81. The supremacy clause essentially is the same as
the preemption doctrine. J. NowAK, supra note 11, at 267. The supremacy clause declares
federal law supersedes, i.e. preempts, state law. Id. at 267; Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1982); see Brief for Appellee at 41-47, Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Heintz, 760 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1985) (BG&E's argument that section 24(e) violates
supremacy clause). BG&E argued, in both the district court and the Court of Appeals, that
Congress passed the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) to foster the good
aspects of the public utility holding company system. Brief, at 45. BG&E argued that a state,
therefore, cannot prohibit entirely the formation of public utility holding companies because to
do so would violate the supremacy clause. Id. at 43-47; see also Baltimore Gas, 582 F. Supp.
at 680-81 (district court refused to accept BG&E's supremacy clause argument).
38. Baltimore Gas, 582 F. Supp. at 680-81; see infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text
(discussing Maryland district court's analysis in rejecting BG&E's argument that section 24(e)
violated supremacy clause).
39. Baltimore Gas, 582 F. Supp. at 680-81; see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525-26 (1976) (setting forth test for supremacy clause analysis).
40. Baltimore Gas, 582 F. Supp. at 680-81.
41. Baltimore Gas, 582 F. Supp. at 680-81; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
15 U.S.C. § 79i(a)(2) (SEC has power to prohibit acquisition of public utility company by holding
company). But see supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining BG&E's contention that
Congress intended to foster public utility holding companies by enacting PUHCA).
42. See Baltimore Gas, 582 F. Supp. at 681-82 (district court's determination that section
24(e) violated commerce clause); Brief for Appellee, supra note 37, at 11-32 (BG&E's arguments
that 24(e) violated commerce clause); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause). Congress
possesses the sole authority to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Although Congress retains sole authority to regulate interstate commerce, a state may pass
legislation that incidentally affects interstate commerce if the state's regulation conforms to the
standards set by the Supreme Court. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). If
a state statute regulates even-handedly in pursuit of legitimate local state interests, and only
incidentally affects interstate commerce, a court should uphold the state statute unless the
burden on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the local benefits. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
43. Baltimore Gas, 582 F. Supp. at 679-80. In Baltimore Gas the district court held that
the Maryland legislature could have addressed adequately the fears of dangers posed by public
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less restrictive alternatives." Accordingly, the district court held that section
24(e) of the Maryland Public Service Commission Law violated the commerce
clause.

45

Following the adverse ruling of the district court, the Maryland PSC
appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 46 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district
47
addressing four constitutional issues.4 8 First, BG&E claimed that
court,
PUHCA preempted section 24(e) of the Maryland Public Service Commission
Law.4 9 Applying the same test that the district court applied, the Fourth
Circuit concurred with the district court's holding that PUHCA did not
preempt the Maryland statute. 0 The Fourth Circuit noted that PUHCA
anticipated coordinated federal and state regulation of public utility holding
companies. 5 ' The Baltimore Gas court stated that PUHCA would preempt
section 24(e) only if section 24(e) stood as an obstacle to the achievement of
the purposes of PUHCA. s2 The Fourth Circuit found that PUHCA evinced
utility holding companies by merely requirihg PSC approval of all proposed transfers of assets
rather than an outright prohibition on certain transfers. Id. at 680.
44. Id. at 682. The district court in Baltimore Gas found that the Maryland Public Service
Commission Law burdened interstate commerce because section 24(e) prevented BG&E and
BGE CORP. from diversifying into areas beyond PSC control, adversely affected BG&E's
ability to get financing, and prohibited BG&E stockholders from exchanging BG&E shares for
BG&E CORP. stock. Id. The district court in Baltimore Gas found that the only state interests
served by an outright ban on public utility holding companies was the avoidance of administrative
costs, an interest that did not mitigate the burden imposed on interstate commerce. Id. The
district court did not address the merits of BG&E's constitutional challenges based on the equal
protection and due process clauses. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Heintz, 760 F.2d 1408-27 (4th Cir. 1985) (Fourth
Circuit opinion upholding section 24(e) of Maryland Public Service Commission Law).
47. Id. at 1427. Initially the Fourth Circuit noted that no legislative history interpreting
section 24(e) existed and that neither federal courts nor Maryland courts had construed the
section. Id. at 1413. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, looked to the PSC's interpretation of section
24(e) since the Maryland legislature had charged the PSC with the enforcement of the provisions
of article 73 of the Maryland Annotated Code. Id. at 1414. The Fourth Circuit found that the
PSC's interpretation of section 24(e) was reasonable and consistent with the wording of the
statute. Id. at 1414; see NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S.
170, 177 (1981) (court pays great deference to administrative agency enforcing statute); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1968) (court should follow construction
of statute by agency charged with statute's execution unless compelling evidence shows that
administrative agency's interpretation is wrong).
48. Id. at 1414-27; see infra notes 50-92 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
constitutional analysis in Baltimore Gas).
49. Id. at 1414-16. The Supreme Court has recognized that the preemption doctrine stems
from the supremacy clause. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152
(1982) (preemption doctrine rooted in supremacy clause); see supra note 37 and accompanying
text (supremacy clause provides that federal law overrides i.e. preempts, state law).
50. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1414; see supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text
(discussing district court's findings on issue of preemption).
51. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1415; see supra note 12 and accompanying text (detailing
examples in PUHCA acknowledging state role in regulating public utility companies).
52. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1415; see supra note 39 and accompanying text (federal
law preempts state law if state law stands as obstacle to achievement of congressional objectives).
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congressional regulatory restraint in attacking the evils inherent in public
utility holding companies. 3 PUHCA, according to the Fourth Circuit, does
not preclude a state from enacting regulations more restrictive than the
regulations of PUHCA.5 4 Although the federal law does not prohibit unilaterally the formation of public utility holding companies,15 the Fourth Circuit
found that Congress did not intend to prevent states from forbidding the
initial formation of public utility holding companies. 6 Since section 24(e)'s
regulations of holding company acquisitions of public utility companies do
not frustrate the aims of PUHCA, the Fourth Circuit held that PUHCA
does not preempt section 24(e) of the Maryland Public Service Commission
57
Law.
In addition to the supremacy clause issue, the Fourth Circuit considered
whether section 24(e) of the Maryland statute violated the equal protection
clause." BG&E claimed that the classification in the Maryland statute,
distinguishing holding companies presently owning a public utility from
holding companies not presently owning a public utility for purposes of
determining eligibility for acquisition of a public utility, was a denial of
equal protection. 9 The Fourth Circuit employed a two-tiered analysis to
determine whether the Maryland statute violated the equal protection clause. 6°
53. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1415 In holding that PUHCA represented congressional
regulatory restraint rather than acquiescence to the multiplication of public utility holding
companies, the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Gas relied on the amicus curiae brief that the SEC
submitted. Id. at 1415-16. The SEC determined that PUHCA did not preempt section 24(e)
because a congressional decision to forbid certain types of public utility holding companies did
not indicate necessarily a congressional intent that public utility holding companies were beyond
the reach of state statutes. Id. at 1416.
54. BaltimoreGas, 760 F.2d at 1416. According to the Fourth Circuit, Congress' requiring
in PUHCA the meeting of certain conditions before a holding company may acquire a public
utility company does not indicate a legislative intent that states cannot prohibit the initial
formation of public utility holding companies. Id.
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1982). The SEC may order only the simplification of public
utility holding companies that are unnecessarily complex. Id.; see supra note 9 and accompanying
text (detailing factors SEC must consider in allowing public utility holding company to continue
existence).
56. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1416. The Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Gas found that
Congress' decision to eliminate certain public utility holding companies embodied regulatory
restraint and not an intent to foster the growth of public utility holding companies. Id. at 1415.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that section 24(e) did not undermine congressional objectives and
Maryland could forbid the initial formation of public utility holding companies. Id. at 1416;
see supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (Congress contemplated state regulation of public
utility holding companies).
57. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1416.
58. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1416-18; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (no state can deny
any person equal protection of the laws).
59. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 37, at 33-34. BG&E claimed that section 24(e)
violated the equal protection clause because section 24(e) allowed a holding company already
controlling a public utility to acquire more than 100 of another public utility with approval of
the Maryland PSC, while a holding company not owning a public utility never could acquire
more than 10% of the securities of a public utility. Id.
60. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1417-18. The Fourth Circuit's two-tiered equal protection
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The Fourth Circuit stated that a state statute must serve a legitimate state
purpose and the state legislature reasonably must have thought that the
classification would promote that purpose. 6 The Fourth Circuit in Baltimore
Gas found that the state's interest in protecting the consumer public through
regulation of public utility holding companies was a legitimate use of the
state's police powers, and that the Maryland legislature rationally could have
believed the classification would further the state's interests. 62 In limiting the
eligible holding companies to holding companies already owning a public
utility and subjecting holding companies to review by the PSC, the Fourth
Circuit found that the statute ensures the availability of the public utility
company's records so that the PSC can examine the records to determine
whether the potential exists for abusive practices harmful to the consumer. 63
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit recognized that when a holding company
already owns a public utility, "utilities of scale," such as economic benefits
derived from consolidation of a number of public utility companies into one
holding company system, might exist that outweigh the potential dangers of
a holding company structure. 64 Since Maryland possessed a legitimate state

analysis entailed two findings. Id. at 1417. First, the Fourth Circuit determined whether the
challenged statute served a legitimate state interest. Id. Second, the Fourth Circuit determined
whether the Maryland legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification between
holding companies ownifg public utility companies and holding companies not controlling
public utility companies would promote a legitimate state purpose. Id.; see infra notes 61-64
and accompanying text (discussing analysis for determining whether a statute violates equal
protection clause).
61. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1417; City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976). When analyzing an equal protection challenge to a state statute the Supreme Court
defers to local economic legislation if the legislative classification attempts to fulfill a legitimate
state interest and the legislature rationally could have believed the classification would promote
the state purpose. Id.; see infra notes 113-116 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection
clause analysis).
62. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1417-18. The Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Gas held that
the state interest the Maryland legislature may have been seeking to effectuate through section
24(e) was the ensured continuation of utility services to consumers and maintaining the financial
responsibility of public utility companies. Id. The Fourth Circuit found that the continuation
of public utility services to local consumers was a legitimate objective and that Maryland had
the constitutional power to pursue that objective under the state police power. Id.; see supra
note 11 and accompanying text (defining state police power to regulate public utility companies).
63. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1417-18.
64. Id. at 1418. When a holding company already owns a public utility, economies of
scale might outweigh possible detriments to the consumer public that accompany a public utility
holding company. Id. The concept of economies of scale refers to the fact that a holding
company controlling a public utility company is familiar with the public utility industry and
such knowledge would assist the holding company in controlling another public utility company
and operating the public utility more efficiently. Id. PUHCA recognizes that economices of
scale may outweigh the potential for abuse in the context of public utility holding companies.
See 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1) (1982). A holding company, in order to obtain SEC approval of an
additional system to the holding company structure, must show that the additional system could
not operate independent of the holding company without loss of economies, causing economic
harm to the public utility and ultimately to consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1). The Supreme

19861

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

interest in controlling pubic utility holding companies and could have believed
rationally that section 24(e) would further the state's interests, the Fourth
Circuit found that section 24(e) of the Maryland Public Service Commission
Law did not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. 65
The Fourth Circuit next addressed BG&E's claim that section 24(e)
violated constitutional due process. 66 BG&E claimed that the PSC did not
apply section 24(e) consistently, thereby constituting selective enforcement in
violation of the due process clause. 67 BG&E alleged that the PSC previously
had permitted several public utility acquisitions that violated the terms of
section 24(e).68 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that principles of administrative law require an administrative agency to explain deviations from
established precedent. 69 The Fourth Circuit, however, held that the requirement that an administrative agency explain deviations from established
precedent applies only in a direct review of agency action.70 Although the
Maryland Code provides for direct review in Maryland state courts, BG&E

did not seek direct review through state channels but, instead, sought declaratory judgment in federal court.7' The Fourth Circuit stated that a party
Court has accepted the economies of scale rationale found in PUHCA. S.E.C. v. New Eng.
Elec. Sys., 384 U.S. 176, 179, 185 (1965). In New Eng. Elec., the Supreme Court held that the
federal ban on public utility holding companies could be bypassed when the loss of economies
would be substantial if the public utility companies operated independently. Id. at 179.
65. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1418.
66. Id. at 1418-20; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV (neither states nor the federal government
can deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law). See generally J.
NOWAK, supra note 11, at 385-16 (discussing due process requirements and history of due process
clause).
67. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 37, at 35-39 (detailing BG&E's due process
argument). BG&E argued that by allowing other similar public utility acquisitions and denying
the proposed acquisition of BG&E, the PSC violated BG&E's due process rights because the
PSC failed to justify the denial. Id.
68. Brief for Appellee, supra note 37, at 35-39; Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1418. BG&E
named six instances in which the Maryland PSC allegedly allowed public utility acquisitions
that violated section 24(e). Brief for Appellee, supra note 37, at 38-39. BG&E, however,
admitted that the Maryland PSC never considered section 24(e) in connection with the alleged
illegal transactions. Brief for Appellee, supra note 37, at 37. The Fourth Circuit held that
BG&E's admission that the PSC never considered section 24(e) in connection with the alleged
illegal acquisitions precluded BG&E from proving that the PSC acted with impermissible intent
in denying BG&E's application. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1419-20.
69. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1418. The principle that an administrative agency must
explain deviations from precedent is a logical requirement because, to hold otherwise, would
mean an agency would not have to explain why the agency treated differently two similar fact
situations. Id.; see Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 653-54 (1954). In
reviewing an administrative agency's disparate treatment of similar circumstances, a reviewing
court needs a precise means, in the form of an agency explanation, by which to measure the
agency's actions before the court can declare an agency's actions to be correct or incorrect.
Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. at 654.
70. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1419.
71. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 89-98 (1980). Under the Maryland Public Service Commission Law, a person may question the validity of a PSC ruling or regulation through a
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seeking to invalidate an administrative act as violative of due process must

prove that the administrative agency acted on some constitutionally impermissible criterion, such as race or sex, in denying the merger. 72 The Fourth
Circuit indicated that impermissible intent or motive would be necessary to
violate due process, and the Fourth Circuit held that BG&E could make no

showing of impermissible motive since the BG&E case represented the first
instance in which the PSC invoked section 24(e). 73 The Fourth Circuit,

74
therefore, concluded that section 24(e) did not violate the due process clause.

In addition to rejecting BG&E's claims that section 24(e) of the Maryland
Public Service Commission Law violated the supremacy clause, the equal
protection clause, and the due process clause, the Fourth Circuit rejected
BG&E's contention that section 24(e) violated the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. 7 The Fourth Circuit noted that under the com-

merce clause Congress maintains exclusive authority to regulate interstate
commerce and that a virtually per se rule of unconstitutionality exists
regarding state statutes that directly regulate interstate commerce. 7 6 The

Fourth Circuit indicated, however, that courts have developed a principle
that recognizes a state's ability to regulate local concerns when the state

legislation has an indirect effect on interstate commerce, unless the burden
on interstate commerce is excessive. 77 The Fourth Circuit chose to apply the
petition for declaratory judgment to the Superior court in Baltimore City or to the circuit court
for the county in which the petitioner has his main office. Id. at § 89. The petitioner may
request further review through an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals if he is unsatisfied
with the result in the declaratory judgment proceeding. Id. at § 98.
72. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1419; see United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144,
152 (1937). In Carolene Prods., the Supreme Court declared that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to state economic regulatory schemes. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152. A
state economic statute violates the due process clause if there is absolutely no rational basis on
which the legislature could have believed that the legislation would further valid state interests.
CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 152. In the realm of noneconomic regulations, a court will strike
down a statute if the statute impinges on a fundamental right and the legislative means are not
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1972)
(individual possessed fundamental right to bodily privacy in deciding whether to have abortion,
and legislature can violate fundamental right only in pursuit of compelling state interests using
methods necessary to effectuation of states interests); see infra note 131 and accompanying text
(Fourth Circuit applied equal protection analysis to due process clause issue).
73. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1419-20. The absence of an explanation for an agency's
decision to enforce a statutory provision in one case and not to enforce the provision in another
similar case, absent an impermissible motive on the part of the administrative agency, does not
amount to a deprivation of due process. Id. at 1419. The Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Gas
stated that BG&E never could show an impermissible intent in the Maryland PSC's actions
relating to BG&E CORP.'s application for acquisition of BG&E because in no comparable set
of circumstances did the PSC invoke or discuss section 24(e). Id. at 1419-20.
74. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1420.
75. Id. at 1420-27; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause grants to Congress
the power to regulate commerce with foreign countries and to regulate commerce among the
states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3; see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing
Baltimore Gas district court's commerce clause analysis).
76. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1420; see Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1981)
(commerce clause prohibits direct state regulation of interstate commerce); see supra note 42
(state cannot regulate directly interstate commerce but may affect indirectly interstate commerce).
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test the United States Supreme Court established in Pike v. Bruce Church78
to determine whether section 24(e) violated the commerce clause. 7 9 The Pike
test requires an initial determination of whether a state statute regulates
evenhandedly. 0 According to the Fourth Circuit, evenhandedness means the
statute does not seek to protect local economic interests by discriminating
against out-of-state businesses.8 ' The Fourth Circuit stated that if the statute
regulates evenhandedly, a court then must determine whether the statute
seeks to effectuate legitimate local interests and whether the statute's effects
on interstate commerce are incidental.8 2 The Fourth Circuit concluded that
if a state statute serves legitimate state interests and only incidentally affects
interstate commerce, the court will uphold the state statute, unless the burden
3
on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the local benefits.
In applying the Pike test, the Baltimore Gas court found that section
24(e) of the Maryland Code regulated evenhandedly, because the regulation
applied equally to all companies and did not favor local commerce over outof-state commerce.4 The Fourth Circuit next determined that section 24(e)
advanced the legitimate state interest of protecting the local consumer of
public utility services and products by regulating the rates and corporate
structure of public utility companies. 5 Addressing the next hurdle of the
77. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1419-20; see, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142
(state incidentally may affect interstate commerce in pursuit of legitimate local interests unless
burden on interstate commerce clearly outweighs local benefits); Arkansas Elec. Corp. v.
Arkansas Pub. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 393-95 (1983) (applying Pike commerce clause test to
uphold public service commission's jurisdiction ovbr retail rates charged by public utility);
Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981) (commerce
clause is explicit constitutional grant of authority to Congress to regulate interstate commerce
but Congress may grant to states power to restrict flow of interstate commerce). The Fourth
Circuit followed the Pike commerce clause test, finding that the Supreme Court had not
formulated a new commerce clause analysis. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1421-22; see infra note
134 and accompanying text (Baltimore Gas court correctly applied Pike commerce clause test
and appropriately found that Supreme Court had not formulated different commerce clause
test); Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142-43.
78. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142 (courts will uphold state statutes that regulate
evenhandedly in pursuit of legitimate state interest unless burden on interstate commerce clearly
is greater than local benefits).
79. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1422.
80. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142.

81. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1422-23; see Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S.
27, 3642 (1980) (state statute is not regulating evenhandedly if statute prevents only out-of-state
businesses from giving investment advice in state).
82. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1423-24; see Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142 (if
statute regulates evenhandedly, court will uphold state statute if statute only incidentally affects
interstate commerce and pursues legitimate state interests).
83. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1423-24.
84. Id. at 1422-23; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(e) (1980) (both in-state and out-ofstate holding companies are subject to section 24(e)).
-85. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1424-25. A state's power to regulate public utilities
traditionally is associated with the state's police power. See supra note 11 and accompanying
text (states legitimately may regulate public utilities pursuant to police power because of local
character of public utility companies). The Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Gas determined that
state power to regulate the corporate structure of public utilities is implicit in the police power
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Pike test, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that section 24(e) imposes burdens
on interstate commerce, 6 but found the burden to be minimal and out-

weighed by Maryland's interest in protecting consumers of public utility
company services.

7

Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered whether prohibit-

ing the formation of public utility holding companies served the state interest
in light of possibly less restrictive means to protect the public against the
evils of public utility holding companies.8" In the context of a commerce
clause analysis, the Fourth Circuit stated that the court will analyze alternate

means only if the challenged statute discriminates against interstate commerce.8 9 The Baltimore Gas court found that when a state's method for

achieving a legitimate state interest does not discriminate against out-of-state
businesses, the court will not declare that choice unconstitutional merely

because equally nondiscriminatory means exist. 90 The Fourth Circuit stated

that the state legislature, rather than the court, should choose among the
nondiscriminatory alternatives. 9' The Fourth Circuit ultimately determined

that section 24(e) of article 78 of the Maryland Annotated Code was
constitutional. 92
to regulate public utility companies. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1424; accord Bridgewater
Hydraulic Co. v. Council on Water Co. Lands, 453 F. Supp. 942, 951 (D. Conn. 1978) (logical
for state to be concerned about management of public service companies because that management is related to public interest and welfare). The Fourth Circuit found that the congressional
recognition of the evils inherent in public utility holding companies, coupled with the state's
authority to regulate public utility companies, proved the legitimacy of the state's interest of
protecting consumers by regulating public utility holding companies. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d
at 1424-25; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (detailing dangers inherent in public utility
holding company structure).
86. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1425; see supra note 44 and accompanying text (burdens
section 24(e) imposed on interstate commerce included prohibiting BG&E stockholders from
exchanging BG&E shares for shares of BGE CORP. and preventing BG&E and BGE CORP.
from diversifying into areas beyond PSC control).
87. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1425-26. In Baltimore Gas, the Fourth Circuit held that
Maryland had a strong state interest in regulating public utility holding companies. Id. at 1425.
The Fourth Circuit found that section 24(e) fully complied with the state interest in protecting
consumers because by preventing the formation of public utility holding companies, section
24(e) precluded the possibility of the evils accompanying public utility holding companies that
harm consumers. Id. at 1426. The Fourth Circuit further found that the exception to the allencompassing prohibition of holding company acquisition of public utility companies, which
allowed holding companies already owning a utility to acquire another public utility, also
supported the state interest in protecting the consumer because section 24(e) required PSC
review of the holding company's application to assure protection of consumers. Id. at 1426-27.
88. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1427.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see infra note 120 and accompanying text (court will not alter legislature's choice
of method if two legitimate statutory means exist that do not discriminate against out-of-state
businesses).
91. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1427. In Baltimore Gas the Fourth Circuit refused to substitute
the court's judgment for the state legislature's determination since the state legislature selected
a nondiscriminatory means to address a legitimate state interest. Id.
92. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1427; see supra notes 57, 63, 74 and accompanying text
(Baltimore Gas court concluded that section 24(e) was not unconstitutional).

1986]

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Baltimore Gas is a case of first impression because no other state has
enacted a statute with a provision similar to section 24(e) of the Maryland
Public Service Commission Law. 93 State legislatures have employed various94
methods of regulating the corporate structure of public utility companies.

Some state statutes require an individual or corporation to acquire the state
public service commission's approval before acquiring more than a fixed
percentage of a public utility company.95 Other state statutes require that a
public utility company seeking to acquire the stock of another public utility
96
company obtain approval of the state public service commission. Most

states, however, regulate the reorganization of public utility companies
through general antitakeover statutes. 97 General antitakeover statutes are not
93. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 37, at 4 (section 24(e) of Maryland Public Service
Commission Law is historical anomaly); see infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (examples
of state statutes regulating ownership of public utility companies).
94. See generally HAwEs, supra note 2, at § 12.03 (detailing states specifically regulating
ownership and control of public utility companies).
95. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-10 (West Cum Supp. 1985) (sale or transfer of
majority of stock of public utility company requires approval of New Jersey Public Service
Commission); N.Y. PUBLIC SERV. LAW § 70 (West Cum. SUpp. 1985) (no stock corporation
shall acquire more than 10% of voting stock of gas or electric utility corporation without prior
approval of New York Public Service Commission); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-47 (West
1985) (no holding company can gain majority control of Connecticut gas, electric, water or
cable service corporation without obtaining public service Commission's approval). Section 24(e)
differs from other state statutes in that section 24(e) absolutely disallows the acquisition of
more than 10% of a public utility company by a holding company unless the holding company
already owns a public utility company and the PSC approves of the acquisition. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 78, § 24(e) (1980). Section 24(e), however, roughly parallels state statutes requiring
commission approval before a holding company may acquire a certain percentage of a public
utility company since section 24(e) requires PSC approval before a holding company can acquire
more than 10% of a public utility company's stock acquired as collateral security. Id.
96. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 65-89 (1981) (Virginia public utility corporation must obtain
approval of state public utility commission before public utility divests or acquires utility assets);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 107 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (public service corporation cannot acquire
control of another public service corporation without approval of Vermont Public Service
Commission that transaction will not harm public good); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-04-06 (1978)
(public utility company must have North Dakota Public Service Commission's approval before
public utility can acquire stock of another public utility company). The Maryland Public Service
Commission Law is similar to the Virginia, Vermont, and North Dakota statutes in that the
Maryland Code does require the Maryland PSC's approval before one public utility company
can acquire any stock in another public utility company. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(b)(2)
(1980).
97. See Note, A FailedExperiment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. Mite Corp.,
1983 U. OF ILL. L.F. 457-58, 457 fn. 4 (1983) (listing states with general antitakeover statutes);
E. ARANOW, H. EINHoRN, G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 205-07 (1977). State antitakeover statutes regulate tender offers through various means,
including requiring disclosure of information, requiring hearings, regulating the length of time
before a tender offer is effective, and regulating the possibilities of withdrawal of the tender
offer. Id. The future of the general antitakeover statutes is in question following the Supreme
Court's ruling in Edgar v. MITE. See Edgar v. MITE, Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982)
(invalidating Illinois antitakeover statute). The Illinois antitakeover statute required any company
seeking to acquire a target company to register with the Illinois Secretary of State twenty days
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designed specifically to regulate takeover attempts of public utility companies. 98 Instead, holding company acquisitions of public utility companies fall
within state general antitakeover statutes as would a holding company

takeover of any company. 99 Section 24(e) differs from other state statutes
regulating public utility holding companies because the Maryland provision

prohibits the acquisition of a public utility by a holding company not
presently controlling a public utility.10 Other state statutes that regulate

public utility holding companies do not prohibit the acquisition of a public
utility company by a holding company, but, instead, utilize a permissive
procedure requiring state public service commission approval of a takeover
acquisition.'10
before the registration became effective. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 626-27; ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121
,
137.54.A,E (1979) (repealed 1983). Under the Illinois statute a target company was
a corporation which had 10% or more shareholders located in Illinois, or which met any two
of the following three conditions: the corporation had its executive offices in Chicago, was organized
pursuant to Illinois law, or had 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus within Illinois.
137.52-10 (1979) (repealed 1983). During the twenty day waiting
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 /,
period, the secretary could deny registration if, after a hearing, the secretary found the tender
offer failed to disclose adequate information or the takeover offer was inequitable. ILL. REV.
137.57.E (repealed 1983). The federal government regulates tender offers,
STAT. ch. 121 'A,
requiring registration with the SEC and disclosure of certain information. The Williams Act of
1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(e), 78n(d)(f) (1982). The major aim of the federal act is to protect
the investor by neither favoring the management nor the takeover bidder. Edgar, 457 U.S. at
633. The Supreme Court in Edgar held that the Illinois Act violated the supremacy clause because
the Illinois secretary of state could reject a takeover bidder's registration if the secretary determined the offer to be unfair, which would violate the Williams Act's aim of allowing investors
to be free in making investment decisions. Edgar, 475 U.S. at 639. The Supreme Court also
held that the Illinois Act favored incumbent management in direct contravention of the Williams
Act. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 635. The Edgar Court held that the Illinois Act violated the commerce
clause because the burdens on interstate commerce exceeded the local benefits. Edgar, 451 U.S.
at 643. The Supreme Court stated that the Illinois statute did not serve the legitimate state interest
in protecting local shareholders because the definition of a target company posed the possibility
that the Illinois secretary could prevent a takeover by an out of state corporation of a company
not having any Illinois shareholders. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644; see infra notes 154-62 and accompanying text (discussing Edgar holding under commerce clause and distinguishing Illinois statute
and 24(e) of Maryland statute). A number of federal circuit courts have applied the Edgarholding
to invalidate state antitakeover statutes. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715
F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding Oklahoma antitakeover act unconstitutional because
statute resembled unconstitutional Illinois antitakeover statute); Martin-Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 566-67 (6th Cir. 1982) (invalidating Michigan antitakeover statute
based on Edgar); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128 (8th Cir. 1982)
(invalidating Missouri antitakeover statute based on Edgar and Missouri statute's close resemblance to Illinois antitakeover statute).
98. See HAWES, supra note 2, at § 12.03 (state general antitakeover statutes aimed at a
general corporate takeover which implicitly includes public utility companies).
99. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (state general antitakeover statutes implicitly
include public utility companies).
100. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(e) (1980); cf. supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text
(unlike section 24(e) of Maryland Public Service Commission Law, other state statutes do not
contain outright prohibitions of holding company acquisitions of public utility companies).
101. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (state statutes use permissive procedures
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Because section 24(e) of the Maryland Public Service Commission Law
is a unique provision, various constitutional issues arise concerning the
validity of the statute. 02 The Fourth Circuit first addressed BG&E's argument
that section 24(e) violated the supremacy clause and correctly held that
PUHCA did not preempt section 24(e).'10 The Supreme Court has articulated

a two part inquiry by which a court should evaluate a claim of federal
preemption.'04 First, a court must determine whether Congress has enacted
a federal statute explicitly prohibiting the states from regulating the area in
which the state statute seeks to regulate. 105 If Congress has enacted such a
statute, federal law preempts state lav.' 6 Second, if the federal statute in

question does not expressly prohibit state regulation, a court must determine
whether the state statute stands as an obstacle to the achievement of the full
purposes of the federal statute. 0 7 To establish the purpose of the federal

statute, the court must consider the congressional intent. 0 8 In dealing with

in which state public service commissions consider each proposed acquisition of public utility
company by holding company or by another public utility company).
102. See supra notes 48-92 and accompanying text (discussing BG&E's constitutional
challenges to section 24(e)).
103. See Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1414-16 (Fourth Circuit addressed BG&E's supremacy
clause argument); see also infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in
Baltimore Gas correctly applied Supreme Court test for preemption and appropriately found
PUHCA did not preempt section 24(e)).
104. See, e.g., Arkansas Elec. v. Arkansan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 389 (1983)
(federal government may preempt state law expressly or implicitly); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-06 (1983) (federal law may preempt state
law to extent that state law stands as obstacle to achievement of full congressional objectives,
even though federal law contains no explicit preemptive language); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (Fidelity) (state law succumbs to federal law
to extent compliance with both federal and state law is impossible); Edgar v. White, 457 U.S.
at 631 (federal law preempts state law to extent state law blocks achievement of congressional
purposes); Jones v. Rath, 430 U.S. at 525-26 (federal law preempts state law to extent federal
law expressly prohibits state regulation or to degree that state law stands as an obstacle to
congressional purposes).
105. See Jones v. Rath, 430 U.S. at 525-66. The two-step supremacy clause test requires a
court to determine, first, if Congress explicitly prohibited state regulation within a particular
area. Id. If federal law explicitly does not preempt state regulation, a court determines whether
federal law implicitly precludes state law that might obstruct the achievement of congressional
purposes. Id; see also Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. at 631. The Supreme Court in Edgar initially
found that federal law did not explicitly prohibit state regulation of takeovers. Edgar, 457 U.S.
at 631; Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 153 (congressional statute explicitly may prevent state regulation
in given area).
106. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (federal law preempts state statute if
federal statute expressly prohibits state regulation).
107. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. at 276-81 (finding that Illinois antitakeover statute
frustrated purposes of federal law); Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 159 (federal law preempted state law
because compliance with both statutes was impossible); Jones v. Rath, 430 U.S. at 543 (state
regulation of packaging labels obstructed accomplishment of full purposes of Congress).
108. Fidelity, 485 U.S. 152-53. Since a court needs to know congressional objectives to
determipe if a state statute blocks achievement of a federal statute's purposes, congressional
intent is an integral facet of a court's analysis of a preemption claim. Id. Congressional intent
is indicative of the objectives that Congress seeks to achieve by enacting a statute. Id. at 153.
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public utility companies, the SEC in interpreting PUHCA, as well as PUHCA
on its face, acknowledges the significant role of states in regulating public
utility companies and evinces a congressional intent of coordinated state and
federal regulation of public utility holding companies.' 9 In passing PUHCA,
Congress intended to regulate evils inherent in public utility holding companies."10 By preventing the initial formation of public utility holding companies, section 24(e) of the Maryland Public Service Commission Law does
not obstruct PUHCA's aim of protecting the investing and consuming public
of dealing with public utility companies."' Furthermore, section 24(e) does
not hinder the SEC's regulation of public utility holding companies."2 ' Since
section 24(e) does not undermine the congressional goal of protecting the
general public from the dangers of public utility holding companies, the
Fourth Circuit correctly applied the preemption test and held that PUHCA
did not preempt section 24(e) of the Maryland Public Service Commission
3
Law."
In addition to BG&E's argument that section 24(e) of the Maryland
Public Service Commission Law violated the supremacy clause, BG&E argued
that the classification in the Maryland statute that distinguished between
holding companies presently controlling a public utility company and holding
companies not presently controlling a public utility company was arbitrary
and capricious and violated the equal protection clause." 4 To determine
whether a statute violates the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court

109. See Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 116 n.168. The SEC stated that one of the major
purposes of PUHCA was to facilitate state regulation of public utility companies. Id. For example, the exemption of intrastate holding companies from SEC review presumes that states regulate
intrastate public utility holding companies. Id. at 116. If a state public service commission approves a holding company's acquisition of the assets or securities of a public utility company
and all the public utility companies in question are intrastate public utilities, the SEC cannot
prohibit the transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 79i(b); see supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (both
state and federal agencies regulate public utility holding companies under PUHCA).

110. -15 U.S.C. § 79-79z-6 (1982) (Public Utility Holding Company Act); see supra notes
5-7 and accompanying text (Congress perceived evils inherent in public utility holding companies
and enacted legislation to prevent those dangers).
111. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(e) (1980). Section 24(e) of the Maryland Code has
the effect of preventing a holding company not presently owning a Maryland public utility

company from acquiring a public utility. Id. Section 24(e) encourages PUHCA aims of
eliminating the evils inherent in a public utility holding company by preventing formation of
public utility holding companies and completely avoiding all dangers inherent in a public utility
holding company. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 79a (1982) (setting forth PUHCA aims of protecting
consumers and investors in course of dealings with public utility holding companies).
112. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(e) (1982). Despite section 24(e)'s preclusive effect, the
SEC retains full authority to order simplification of existing public utility holding companies if
the SEC determines that simplification is necessary. 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1982).
113. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (section 24(e) did not block congressional
aims of PUHCA and actually furthered congressional purposes); see supra notes 109-12 and
accompanying text (appropriate test for supremacy clause analysis).
114. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1416. No state can deny any person equal protection of
the law. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
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has established a test that requires a court to determine initially whether the
5
challenged statute serves a legitimate state purpose." If the state statute
serves a legitimate state purpose, a court must assess whether the legislature

was reasonable in believing that the classification would promote that state
interest." 6 In the context of state economic legislation, a court must defer to
the state legislature's determination to avoid 7 the judiciary substituting its
judgment for the judgment of the legislature."
Applying the Supreme Court's equal protection test to section 24(e) of
the Maryland Public Service Commission Law, the Fourth Circuit correctly
"
determined that section 24(e) did not violate the equal protection clause. ,
In the Maryland legislature's judgment, public utility holding companies had

possessed the potential for risky management and financial practices that
could hamper a public utility company's ability to provide adequate and
9
reasonable service to local consumers.' The Fourth Circuit correctly found

that a state limitation upon the formation of public utility holding companies,
pursuant to the state police power and in light of the evils posed by public

115. See, e.g., Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 66872 (1981) (initial determination that court makes in equal protection analysis is whether state
statute serves legitimate local interests); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
461-63 (1981) (promoting energy conservation and lessening solid waste disposal problems is
legitimate state interest); Hunt v. Washington Apply Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353
(1977) (state has legitimate interest in protecting citizens from deceptive marketing of foodstuffs);
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1976) (state economic statute aimed at enhancing
commercial viability of tourist area serves legitimate state purpose); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (state has legitimate interest in encouraging employment of poor).
116. See, e.g., Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. at 668
(classification must be related rationally to legitimate state interest but court cannot secondguess legislature); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 463-70 (court will
uphold statute regardless of proof that legislature actually was mistaken in believing that
classification would further state purposes when evidence before legislature reasonably could
support classification); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303 (equal protection clause demands
only that classification be related rationally to legitimate state interests and, in realm of
economic legislation, legislature has wide latitude in rationality).
117. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963). In area of economic legislation,
a legislature possesses economic expertise and a court cannot substitute the court's judgment
for the legislature's determination. Id.
118. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (explaining why Fourth Circuit's
rationale for decision in Baltimore Gas that section 24(e) did not violate equal protection clause was
correct);
119. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1416-18; see S. Doc. No. 92, supra note 2 at 842-82
(summary of FTC report to United States Senate detailing dangerous elements inherent in public
utility holding companies). The FTC found that public utility holding companies facilitated
excessive fees, misleading and fraudulent accounting methods, and a fragile corporate structure.
Id. at 842-82; M.E. PARRISH, supra note 5, at 147 (public utility holding companies charged
subsidiary public utility companies higher interest rates, resulting in higher utility rates for
consumers); RITCma, supra note 3, at 11 (holding company structure encouraged diversion of
good management away from public utility company to nonutility areas); see supra note 5 and
accompanying text (detailing and discussing evils of public utility holding companies that
necessitated regulation to protect general public).
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utility holding companies, constituted the pursuit of a legitimate state inter20
est.'
In advancing Maryland's interest in protecting consumers of public utility
services, the Maryland legislature could have concluded rationally that classifying holding companies was an adequate means of furthering state purposes.' 2' A court cannot demand that a state use less discriminatory alternatives
in state economic regulation when the state rationally pursues legitimate state
interests. 22 A court acting otherwise would contravene the Supreme Court's
doctrine that prohibits courts from sitting as a "super-legislatures."' '2 Since
the Maryland statute possessed a rational basis for the classification, and the
legislature implemented the classification to further the legitimate state
interest of protecting consumers, the Fourth Circuit properly denied decla-

ratory judgment on BG&E's claim under the equal protection clause.

24

120. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (dangers of public utility holding company
gives legitimacy to state interest in regulating public utility holding companies).
121. See S.E.C. v. New Eng. Elec. Sys., 384 U.S. 176, 179-80 (1966) (recognizing validity of
economies of scale argument). PUHCA limits a holding company system to a single integrated
system. 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1) (1982); S.E.C. v. New Eng. Elec., 384 U.S. at 178 n.7 (single
integrated system cannot include both gas and electric properties). PUHCA created an exemption
for holding companies that show that each independent public utility company could not operate
without significant economic loss. 15 U.S.C. at § 79k(b)(1)(A). Thus, PUHCA generally
recognizes that single integrated holding companies because of their competitive characteristics
are in the best interests of the general public. 15 U.S.C. at § 79k(b)(l). PUHCA acknowledges
that, at times, the inclusion of an additional system to avoid substantial hardship to investors
and consumers might better serve the public's interest. S.E.C. v. New Eng. Elec., 384 at 181-85.
122. See J. NowAK, supra note 11, at 590-99. The Supreme Court does not review
significantly legislative classifications in economic regulations. Id. at 591. If a slight possibility
exists that the legislature had a conceivable basis for the classification the Supreme Court will
not invalidate the law. Id. at 591.
123. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303. In the area of economic legislation, a
court should defer to legislative policy determinations and methods employed to implement the
policy determinations unless the legislative act is wholly arbitrary or invidiously discriminates.
Id. States have a wide latitude in deciding methods of regulating on economic issues pursuant
to a state's police power to regulate local economic sphere. Id. Furthermore, a court should
defer to the interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency the legislature authorizes to
enforce the statute unless compelling evidence exists that the administrative agency's interpretation is incorrect. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170,
177 (1981); Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
124. See Grocery Mfrs. of Am. Inc. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1005 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding
New York statute regulating label requirements for cheese products constitutional). The Second
Circuit stated that a court's first inquiry is whether a legitimate state interest exists. Id. at 1005.
In Grocery Mfrs., the Second Circuit held that the state had an interest in assuring that
consumers received information on the contents of food products. Id. A New York statute
distinguished between manufacturers of real cheese products and manufacturers of cheese
alternatives, and imposed more stringent requirements on manufacturers of cheese alternatives.
Id. The Second Circuit held the classification to be rationally related to legitimate state
objectives. Id.; Salibra v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 730 F.2d 1059, 1063 (6th Cir.) (only minimal
reasonable basis required for classification if challenged state statute does not implicate
fundamental rights or suspect classifications), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 295 (1984); Minnesota
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After rejecting BG&E's equal protection argument, the Fourth Circuit
considered BG&E's claim that the Maryland PSC had violated the due
process clause by selectively enforcing section 24(e).' 25 BG&E argued that the
PSC must explain what BG&E perceived to be a departure from the PSC's
own precedent. 26 In the context of a direct review by an appropriate court
of an administrative agency's action, the Supreme Court has stated that the
administrative agency must explain its departure from precedent.' 27 Different
standards of review exist, however, for a court reviewing the constitutionality
of a statute. 2 By opting for declaratory judgment in federal court, BG&E
forewent direct review as provided under Maryland law. 29 In foregoing
review, BG&E elected to have the federal court apply constitutional law
standards of review rather than standards of review governing direct judicial
review of an administrative agency.' 30 The Fourth Circuit correctly held that
BG&E would have had to prove that the PSC based its actions upon an
unconstitutional criterion, such as race or sex, before the Fourth Circuit
could hold that the PSC violated due process.' The Fourth Circuit correctly
Ass'n of Health Care v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 442, 448 (8th Cir. 1984) (in
local economic sphere only wholly arbitrary act cannot withstand equal protection challenge),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1191 (1985).
125. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 118-20.
126. Brief for Appellee, supra note 37, at 35-39.
127. Id.; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800,
808 (1973) (agency must explain departure from precedent so court can review adequately); see
also K. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE at § 8.9 (2d ed. 1978).
128. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82-83 (1978)
(discussing due process standard of review). Only proof of legislative arbitrariness or irrationality
will overcome the strong presumption in favor of constitutionality which attaches to state
economic statutes. Id. at 83; Administrative Procedure Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). A
federal court reviewing an agency's action will set aside the agency's action if the court finds
that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously manner. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
129. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1419; MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, §§ 89-98 (1980); see supra
note 71 and accompanying text (setting forth Maryland's provisions for direct review of state
agency).

130. See Md. Ann. Code art. 78, § 97 (1980). The Maryland Code requires Maryland
courts reviewing state agency action to affirm the agency unless the agency's action (1) violates
the constitution; (2) exceeds the statutory authority of the agency; (3) achieves its result by
unlawful procedures; (4) is arbitrary and capricious; or (5) is unsupported by substantial
evidence. Id. A federal court reviewing a state statute challenged on due process grounds applies
a federal scope of review. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. at
82-83 (applying narrow scope of review because plaintiff's due process claim attacked economic
legislation which is presumed to be constitutional unless petitioner shows legislative irrationality).
The constitutional due process test resembles the equal protection test. See Cotton States Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663, 669 (11th Cir. 1984) (equal protection analysis of minimum
court scrutiny parallels due process analysis when petitioner challenges commercial regulatory
statute); J. NowAK, supra note 11, at 382-84 (analysis under due process clause identical to

analysis under equal protection clause); see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (Supreme
Court's test for equal protection clause).
131. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. at 82-83 (presumption
of constitutional validity in case of economic legislation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155
(1973) (fundamental right of individual to decide whether to undergo abortion). In due process
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denied BG&E's due process clause arguments because BG&E could not prove
that the PSC denied BG&E's application based on any unconstitutional

criterion. 132
Having disposed of BG&E's due process claim, the Fourth Circuit turned
to BG&E's constitutional challenge under commerce clause.133 The Supreme
Court in Pike v. Bruce Church established how a court should analyze a
party's claim that a state statute violates the commerce clause. 34 Under the
Pike test, a court first determines whether the state statute incidentally affects
interstate commerce. 35 The court then investigates whether the state statute

litigation, if a state statute infringes on a fundamental right, the court must find that the statute
serves a compelling state purpose and the statutory method is necessary to achieve the state
purposes before the court may uphold the statute as constitutional. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at
155. The Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Gas stated that the petitioner would need to show a
suspect classification, such as discrimination based on race or sex, before the court would
proceed with the more strict due process scrutiny. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1419-20. The
Fourth Circuit's use of suspect classification represents a harmless overlap into an equal
protection analysis. See J. NowAc, supra note 11, at 383-84 (detailing overlap of equal protection
analysis and due process analysis).
132. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (absent impermissible criterion, courts
minimally scrutinize state economic legislation for due process violations).
133. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1420-26; see supra note 42 and accompanying text (detailing
BG&E's claim that section 24(e) violated commerce clause).
134. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). When a state statute
regulates evenhandedly in pursuit of legitimate state interests and affects interstate commerce
only incidentally, a court will uphold the state statute unless the burden on interstate commerce
clearly outweighs the local benefits. Id. Pike involved a challenge to an Arizona law that
required all Arizona cantaloupes offered for sale to be packaged in closed standard containers.
Id. at 138. Petitioner grew cantaloupes in Arizona and sent the fruits to California for packaging
and processing. Id. The state of Arizona ordered petitioner to stop bulk shipment of fruit to
California. Id. The practical effect of the state's order would have been to force the petitioner
to build a packaging and processing plant in Arizona. Id. at 140. The state's purpose in the act
was legitimately protecting the reputation of growers within the state by preventing misleading
packaging of cantaloupes. Id. at 143. The Supreme Court, however, held that the state's interest
in having the cantaloupes identified as grown in Arizona was especially tenuous in light of the
significant cost to petitioner if forced to process the cantaloupes in Arizona. Id. at 145; accord
Arkansas Elec. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. at 394 (applying Pike test). The
Supreme Court in Arkansas Elec. noted that modern commerce clause analysis involves balancing
the state statute's nature, the state statute's objectives, and the state statute's effect upon the
national interest in commerce. Arkansas Elec., 461 U.S. at 390. While the Arkansas Elec. Court
discussed the balancing approach, the Supreme Court still applied the Pike test to the facts. Id.
at 394-95. The Second Circuit, relying on Arkansas Elec., found that the Supreme Court will
continue to use the Pike test to analyze commerce clause challenges. Rochester Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1985); see supra notes 76-92 and
accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's application of Supreme Court's commerce clause
test).
. 135. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; see Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-42
(1981) (state statute does not regulate evenhandedly if statute prevents only out-of-state
businesses from giving investment advice in-state); Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981) (virtual per se rule of unconstitutionality exists for state
statutes directly regulating interstate commerce); see supra note 134 and accompanying text
(detailing Supreme Court's application of commerce clause analysis).
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regulates evenhandedly in pursuing a legitimate state interest. a6 Finally, if a
court finds a legitimate state interest,- the court then may consider whether
a means less burdensome to interstate commerce also might achieve the state
purpose."' The Fourth Circuit, however, found that an inquiry into the
existence of less burdensome means of achieving state goals is not mandatory
unless the court initially finds that the statute discriminates against interstate
commerce.' 6 If a state passes legislation that a court finds to be evenhanded,
and, therefore, not motivated by economic protectionism, the court already
has determined the state's means to be non-discriminatory.' 3 9 Initially, the
Fourth Circuit found the Maryland statute regulated evenhandedly because
the statute did not protect local economic interests at the expense of out-ofstate businesses. 40 The legislation only addressed takeovers of Maryland
public utilities.' 4' Under the Maryland statute neither out-of-state nor instate holding companies can acquire a Maryland public utility unless the
holding company presently controls another Maryland public utility company.' 41 If the legislation had precluded only out-of-state holding companies
from acquiring a Maryland public utility company, the court probably would
have found that the statute violated the commerce clause.' 43 Since section

136. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
137. Id.

138. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1427. A court need not determine whether a state could
have used less discriminatory alternatives to achieve the state's interests unless the court initially
finds that the state statute discriminates against interstate commerce. See United States v.
Taylor, 752 F.2d 757, 760 (1st Cir. 1985). If a statute's effects on interstate commerce are
discriminatory, the state has the burden of showing the unavailability of nondiscriminatory
means. United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d at 760; see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
337-38 (1979) (state statute forbidding transportation of minnows out-of-state for sale was
discriminatory on face). When a state statute is facially discriminatory, the court must look for
alternative means of achieving the state's purposes. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 338.
139. See Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. at 36-42 (1980) (state statute
prohibiting out-of-state banks from giving in-state investment advice violated commerce clause).
Discrimination against out of state businesses is not evenhanded regulation. Id. at 36.
140. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1422-23. In commerce clause analysis, a court first must
determine that a state statute does not discriminate against out-of-state interests. Pike, 397 U.S.
at 142. Discrimination against out-of-state interests would be contrary to the national interest
in freely moving national trade and commerce. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662, 669 (1981) (invalidating state law prohibiting 65 foot double trailer trucks).
141. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(e) (1980). The Maryland legislation could protect only
local users of public utility companies because the PSC's jurisdiction extended to only Maryland
public utility companies. Id. at § 1.
142. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78 § 24(e) (1980).
143. See Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers Inc., 447 U.S. at 36-42; FLA. STAT. § 659.141 (1972)
(repealed 1980), § 660.10 (1972) (renumbered as amended § 660.41 1980). In B.T. Inv., a Florida
statute prohibited out of state banks and trust companies from giving investment advice within
the state. 447 U.S. at 36-40; FLA. STAT. § 659.141(1) (1972) (repealed 1980), § 660.10 (1972)
(renumbered as amended § 660.41 1980). The Florida statute overtly prohibited out-of-state
businesses from competing in a local market. 447 U.S. at 339. The statute did not regulate
evenhandedly and the Supreme Court in B.T. Inv. found the Florida statute to be unconstitutional. Id. at 142.
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24(e) did not distinguish between Maryland and out-of-state holding companies, the statute regulated evenhandedly.-"

After finding that section 24(e) regulated evenhandedly, the Fourth
Circuit considered the legitimate state purpose issue and correctly found that

the Maryland provision effectuated a legitimate state interest. 45 The power
to regulate public utility companies to protect local consumers is within the

state police power. 46 Congress acknowledged in PUHCA the state interest
in regulating public utility holding companies. 47 State authority over public
utility companies necessarily includes the power to regulate the corporate

structure of a public utility holding company because the corporate structure
of a public utility is related to the quality of services consumers receive. 48
Accordingly, Maryland's interest in regulating public utility holding compa-

nies is legitimate.
After the Fourth Circuit determined Maryland's interests were legitimate,
the court balanced the state purposes advanced by section 24(e) against any
burdens the statute imposed on interstate commerce and correctly found the
state interests outweighed the burdens on interstate commerce." 49 The Fourth
144. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (section 24(e) applies to both in-state
and out-of-state holding companies and, therefore, constitutes evenhanded regulation).
145. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (explaining why Fourth Circuit in
Baltimore Gas was correct in holding that Maryland legislature pursued legitimate state interest
in protecting public utility consumer); Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1424-25.
146. Arkansas Elec., 461 U.S. at 377. State regulation of public utility companies is a
traditional police power arising out of the local nature of a public utility company and the
consumer's need for the goods and services that the public utility provides. Id.; see supra note
1 and accompanying text (public utility provides services that consumers need on continual
basis); see also Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Council on Water Co., 453 F. Supp. 952, 954 (D.
Conn. 1978) (state may impose regulations on public utilities different from regulations imposed
on other private companies because public utility is public purpose entity franchised by state);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. at 113, 125-26 (1876) (state may regulate private property once that
private property affects public at large).
147. See Blackstone Valley Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 486 A.2d 617, 618 (R.I.
1985) (state public service commission may scrutinize cost allocations between companies within
holding company structure to check for impact on customer rates). Congress intended PUHCA
to supplement state regulation of public utility companies. Id. Regulation of utility companies
traditionally is within the realm of the state police power. Id.; see supra note 12 and
accompanying text (provisions in PUHCA acknowledging state's role in regulating public utility
holding companies).
148. See S. Doc. No. 92, supra note 3, at 881-82 (public utility holding company structure
poses direct threat to consumer receipt of services); RrrcHam, supra note 3, at I1 (public utility
holding company structure encourages rechanneling of managerial talent away from public
utility sector to detriment of consumer).
149. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1425-26. Section 24(e) burdened interstate commerce
because the provision prevented BG&E from diversifying into areas beyond PSC control,
affected BG&E's ability to get financing, and prohibited BG&E stockholders from exchanging
BG&E shares for BGE CORP. stock. Baltimore Gas, 582 F. Supp. at 682. A countervailing
state interest exists in assuring local customers adequate public utility services by protecting
against the dangers posed by public utility holding companies. See S. Doc. No. 92, supra note
3, at 881-82. (FTC report linked public utility holding company's use of unsound business
practices with threat to consumers' receipt of adequate and economical public utility services);
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Circuit correctly characterized the effects on interstate commerce as minimal
when balanced against the strong state interests in protecting the local
consumer. 50 In balancing the competing interests, the Fourth Circuit appro5
priately rejected the commerce clause analysis adopted by the district courtY.
The district court found that while the burden that section 24(e) imposed
upon interstate commerce was not excessive on its face, the burden was
excessive because a less restrictive alternative existed.1 52 The district court
found authority for its analysis in Edgar v. MITE. 5 1 In Edgar, a party
argued that an Illinois antitakeover statute that effectively allowed the Illinois
secretary of state to prevent the takeover transaction violated the commerce
clause.' 54 The state claimed that the legislature designed the statute to protect
local shareholders and was a valid exercise of state police power.5 5 Furthermore, the state claimed an interest in protecting investors from decreases in
the value of stock during a takeover. 56 The Supreme Court in Edgar agreed
that state protection of local shareholders was a legitimate state goal.5 7 The
Supreme Court found that the Illinois statute, however, failed to serve the
state interest because the Illinois statute extended Illinois jurisdiction to
takeovers of companies that had no Illinois shareholders.' 5 8 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court criticized the statute's failure to serve the state interests
M.E. PARISH, supra note 5, at 147 (public utility holding companies charge operating companies
high management fees that consumers eventually pay in form of higher rates); see supra note 5
and accompanying text (discussing evils of public utility holding companies that justify state
regulation of public utility holding companies).
150. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1425.
151. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1425-26; see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text
(detailing district court's analysis of commerce clause in Baltimore Gas).
152. Baltimore Gas, 582 F. Supp. at 682.
153. Edgar-v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).

154. See Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. at 644 (declaring state antitakeover statute unconstitutional). If a state asserts a specific interest and enacts legislation that, in part, does not serve
completely the asserted state interest, the statute is at odds with the state interest. Id. Courts
are reluctant to find that a state statute effectuates a legitimate state interest because the state's
contradiction of itself undermines the state's asserted purpose. Id. at 628. At issue in Edgar
was an antitakeover statute that potentially allowed the state of Illinois to prevent national
takeover attempts. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. at 624; Illinois Business Takeover Act, ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 121
, 137.51-137.70 (1979) (repealed 1983). The Supreme Court in Edgar found
that the Illinois statute violated the commerce clause. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644. The Illinois
statute required a corporation making a takeover offer for the stock of a target company to
register with the Illinois secretary of State. ILL. REy. STAT., ch. 121 V2, 137.54.A. (1979)
(repealed 1983); see supra note 97 and accompanying text (defining target company under
Illinois statute).
155. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644. The Supreme Court in Edgar acknowledged that protecting
state shareholders was a legitimate state goal. Id. The Court, however, stated that a state had
no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders. Id.
156. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644.
157. Id. at 644. The Supreme Court held that a state cannot regulate beyond its borders
without violating the limitation of the state's authority to governing only the state's own citizens.
Id at 642-43.
158. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644; see ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 'A, 137.52-10 (1979) (repealed
1983); see supra note 97 and accompanying text (according to definition of target company
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in all circumstances, because the statute was inapplicable when a corporation
sought to acquire its own stock. 5 9 The Supreme Court found that the Illinois
statute did not protect shareholders sufficiently to justify Illinois' imposition

of regulations governing takeovers.6' Based on the incongruity between the
claimed state interest and the statute's failure to advance the state's interests

in all circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the state interest did not
overcome undue burdens on interstate commerce.' 6' The Supreme Court's

holding in Edgar stands for the proposition that, even if a legitimate state
interest imposes an acceptable degree of burden on interstate commerce, a

court must examine the statute to assure that the statute serves the state's
interest in all circumstances.

62

Applying Edgar to the Maryland statute

demonstrates that the exception in section 24(e), which provides that a
holding company presently controlling a public utility company may acquire
another public utility company with the PSC's permission, is consistent with
the state's interest in protecting local consumers. 63 The exception merely
allowed the Maryland PSC to ensure the best services to consumers of public
utilities because a holding company already controlling a public utility brings
to the acquisition knowledge of public utility companies which will be

significantly beneficial to consumers.

64

The Fourth Circuit properly found

that section 24(e) pursued state interests in all circumstances outweighing
65
burdens on interstate commerce.
under Illinois statute, potential existed for state regulation of takeovers involving no Illinois
shareholders).
159. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644; ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 /2, 1 137.52-9(4) (1979) (repealed
1983) (corporation exempt from provisions of Illinois Business Takeover Act when corporation
attempts to reacquire corporation's own stock).
160. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (economies of scale may further state
interest in providing adequate and reasonable public utility service to consumers).
164. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (comparing dangers public utility holding
companies pose to customers with possible benefits to consumers).
165. Baltimore Gas, 760 F.2d at 1420-27. Other circuits' applications of the commerce
clause test coincides with the Fourth Circuit's application of the commerce clause test in
Baltimore Gas. See, Grocery Mfrs. of Am. Inc. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1003 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Supreme Court in Pike mandated manner for commerce clause analysis); Pike, 397 U.S. at
142. In GroceryMfrs., the Second Circuit found that the state's interest in protecting consumers
of food products by imposing state regulations governing package labeling outweighed burdens
on interstate commerce. Grocery Mfrs. of Am. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d at 1003; Texas v. United
States, 730 F.2d 339, 351 (5th Cir.) (court should uphold state economic regulations unless
clearly excessive burden on interstate commerce exists that outweighs legitimate state interest),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 207 (1984). The Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States held that the
power of state government varies directly with the importance of the local interest that the state
seeks to assure. Texas v. United States, 730 F.2d at 351; Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch,
751 F.2d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding state antitakeover statute). The Minnesota
legislature revised a state antitakeover statute in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Edgar
to decrease the burden on interstate commerce while maintaining the state's legitimate role in
protecting instate investors. Cardiff v. Hatch, 751 F.2d at 909. In Cardiffthe Eighth Circuit
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By enacting section 24(e) of the Maryland Public Service Commission

Law, the Maryland legislature intended to regulate the evils inherent in public
utility holding companies that adversely affect local consumers of a public

utility's goods and services.' 66 The Maryland legislature acted within the
boundaries of the state's police power in pursuing the legitimate state interest

of protecting Maryland consumers by assuring adequate and reasonable
public utility service. 67 The Fourth Circuit, in upholding the statute despite
four claims of constitutional violations, followed the constitutional analysis
prescribed by the United States Supreme Court. 68 The Fourth Circuit's
decision indicates that state regulation of public utility holding companies is
permissible, as long as the regulation protects consumers of public utility

products and services, does not discriminate against out-of-state interests,
and does not conflict with PUHCA.

69

G.

B.

MONIQuE EsCUDERO

Troy v. City of Hampton: The Seventh Amendment Right
to Jury Trial and the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act

The Veterans Reemployment Rights Act (VRA) established a veteran's
right to reemployment by the veteran's previous employer upon returning
from military training or service.' The VRA provides a veteran with the right

held that a state may require an offeror to inform state shareholders of the impact on residents
of a proposed takeover. Cardiff v. Hatch, 751 F.2d at 912; see supra notes 154-55 and
accompanying text (state must be protecting only instate shareholders before state can regulate
takeover attempts affecting interstate commerce).
166. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(e) (1980); see supra note 5 and accompanying text
(documenting evils inherent in public utility holding companies).
167. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (source of state police power authorizing
Maryland's regulation of public utility companies).
168. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit correctly held § 24(e)
did not violate supremacy clause); notes 114-24 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit correctly
found § 24(e) did not violate equal protection clause); notes 125-32 and accompanying text
(Fourth Circuit correctly determined § 24(e) did not violate due process clause); notes 133-65
and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit correctly held § 24(d) did not violate commerce clause).
169. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (state protection of consumers of public
utility company's services is legitimate objective); notes 140-44 and accompanying text (statute
must regulate evenhandedly and not embody economic protectionism); notes 105-13 and
accompanying text (state statutes do not violate PUHCA even if statute prevents initial formation
of public utility holding companies).
1. See Veterans Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1982). The Veterans
Reemployment Rights Act (VRA) provides veterans with the right to reemployment by former
employers following military service. Id. § 2021. Section 2021 of the VRA provides for reemploy-
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to reemployment if the veteran applied for a leave of absence to perform
military service or training2 and if the veteran applies for reemployment
within ninety days after receiving an honorable discharge. 3 Section 2022 of
the VRA empowers federal district courts to compel employers who have
violated the VRA to conform to the VRA's reemployment requirements by
reinstating aggrieved veterans. 4 Furthermore, Section 2022 provides that
federal district courts may require employers who violate the VRA to
compensate wronged veterans by awarding backpay in the amount of wages
and benefits that the veteran lost as a result of the employer's VRA violation.'
An important issue arising in suits brought under the VRA is whether the
seventh amendment right to jury trial attaches in VRA actions. 6 The seventh
amendment right to jury trial will attach in VRA actions only if the remedies

ment if the claimant satisfies the various requirements of the subsequent sections. See infra notes
2-5 and accompanying text (discussing requirements which veterans must meet to claim protection under VRA). Courts may waive an employer's duty to reemploy a veteran if the employer
can show the employer's situation has changed so drastically that reemployment would be
unreasonable. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(B) (1982); see Goggin v. St. Louis, 702 F.2d 698, 703 (8th
Cir. 1983) (court will not waive duty to reemploy veteran merely because temporary replacement
was more efficient and personable); Davis v. Halifax County School Sys., 508 F. Supp. 966,
968 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (reemployment unreasonable only when reinstatement would create useless
job or when reduction in number of employees would reasonably include veteran). Prior to the
enactment of the VRA § 459 of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (MSSA) contained
the reemployment rights now found in the VRA. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 451 & 459 (repealed 1974).
The VRA was a recodification of previously existing reemployment and other rights for the benefit
of veterans of the Vietnam era. See S. REP. No. 93-1240 at 35, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6313, 6344.
2. See 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1982) (providing reemployment rights only for veterans
receiving honorable discharge and applying for reemployment within 90 days of such discharge).
3. See 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d) (1982). Section 2024(d) requires employees who wish to
perform military service or training to request that employers grant leaves of absence. Id. Upon
honorable discharge from the military service, section 2024(d) requires employers to reemploy
the former employee and to confer upon the employee all seniority status, vacation and wages
that the employer would have accorded to the employee had the employee not taken a leave of
absence to perform military service. Id.
4. See 38 U.S.C. § 2022 (1982). Section 2022 invests the federal district courts with
jurisdiction over claims brought under the VRA. Id. Section 2022 gives the district courts the
power to compel employers to reinstate complainants in the complainant's former employment.
Id.
5. See 38 U.S.C. § 2022 (1982). Section 2022 empowers the federal district courts to
compensate aggrieved veterans for wages or benefits lost as a result of the employer's violation
of the VRA. Id. Section 2022 also provides that VRA claimants may apply to the United States
Attorney or a comparable official to represent the VRA claimant in the VRA suit. Id. If the
United States Attorney is reasonably certain that the claimant presents a valid claim under the
VRA, § 2022 requires the United States Attorney to act as the VRA claimant's attorney. Id.
Section 2022 further provides that no state statutes of limitation shall apply to VRA claims. Id.
6. See Mowdy v. ADA Bd. of Educ., 76 F.R.D. 436, 439 (E.D. Okla. 1977). In Mowdy
v. ADA Bd. of Educ. the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
granted a VRA claimant's request for a nonjury trial. Id. at 439. The Mowdy court reasoned
that a claim for lost wages under the VRA is equitable in nature, as evidenced by the application
of the equitable doctrine of laches to VRA suits, rather than state statutes of limitations. Id. at
438-49. The Mowdy court, therefore, determined that because the seventh amendment right to
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provided for in the VRA are essentially legal, rather than equitable, in
7
nature.
Prior to the merger of law and equity in the 1938 enactment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 actions were equitable in nature if no
adequate remedy at law existed. 9 An equitable action was triable only to a
chancellor sitting in a court of equity. 0 In contrast, an action at law was

jury trial does not apply to actions in equity, the seventh amendment does not entitle VRA
claimants to jury trials. Id. at 437; accord Cox v. City of Kansas City, 76 F.R.D. 459, 459-60
(W.D. Mo. 1977); see also infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text (discussing whether
application of laches to VRA claims indicates legislative intent that VRA claims are equitable
and thus not triable to jury). The jury trial issue is important to VRA claimants as it is
important to all claimants, considering the traditional emphasis placed upon the role of the jury
in a democratic system of government. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing
role of jury in democratic government).
7. See Mowdy, 76 F.R.D. at 439 (whether seventh amendment right to jury trial attaches
depends on whether action is legal or equitable in nature). Most courts that have considered
the VRA jury trial issue hold that VRA claimants do not have the right to trial by jury. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing case precedent supporting nonjury trial of VRA
claims). Courts that refuse to grant jury trial under the VRA commonly base such refusal on
the ground that remedies provided in the VRA are equitable and the seventh amendment applies
only to legal causes of action. See Mowdy, 76 F.R.D. at 439 (VRA remedies are equitable in
nature); Hirschberg v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (VRA
claims are equitable). One jurisdiction has supported granting a right to jury trial to MSSA
claimants. See Steffen v. Farmer's Elevator Serv. Co., 109 F. Supp. 16, 20 (N.D. Iowa 1952)
(MSSA claimants seeking backpay have right to jury trial). In Steffen v. Farmer's Elevator
Serv. Co., the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa held that MSSA
claims were triable to juries because MSSA remedies are legal in nature. Steffen, 109 F. Supp.
at 20. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also has held that an award of
backpay to veterans seeking reemployment is a legal remedy. See Gruca v. United States Steel,
495 F.2d 1252, 1256-57 (3d Cir. 1974) (Backpay is legal in nature). In Gruca v. United States
Steel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered the remedy of
backpay as provided in the MSSA, the precursor of the VRA. See Gruca, 495 F.2d at 1256-57
(MSSA backpay is legal in nature); 50 U.S.C. § 459 (repealed 1974); see also supra note 1
(discussing MSSA as precursor of VRA).
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2. Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes
only one form of action-a civil action. Id. Enacted in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure abolished the longstanding practice of having separate courts of law and courts of
equity. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 67 (4th ed. 1983) (federal rules abolished system of
separate courts of law and equity) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. The practical result of the
merger of law and equity was to provide a uniform and orderly procedure through which
claimants could obtain any appropriate remedy. WRIGHT, supra § 67. Before the merger, the
existence of two entirely independent court systems prevented either law courts or chancery
courts from joining an equitable claim with a legal one. WRIGHT, supra § 78. The premerger
system, therefore, required plaintiffs to choose which court would try a claim based on estimation
of what a prediction of the appropriate remedy might be. VRIoT, supra, § 67; see infra notes
9-12 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between law and equity).
9. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 16 (providing that courts should not sustain suits in equity
when an adequate remedy at law exists). See generally R. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY at 11-53 (1961) (tracing development of law and equity in Anglo-American
legal system).
10. See Parsons v. Bedford 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830) (no trial by jury in courts of
equity).
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triable to a judge and jury in a law court." After the 1938 merger of law
and equity eliminated the existence of separate courts of equity, 2 all federal
actions were triable in the federal district courts. 3 The distinction between
equitable actions and actions at law, however, remained important in that
equitable claims were triable to a judge only, while the seventh amendment
required jury trial in claims at law.' 4 In Ross v. Bernhard,5 the United States
Supreme Court enunciated a three part test to determine when the seventh
amendment entitles litigants to jury trials.' 6 The Ross Court stated that the
seventh amendment entitled litigants to trial by jury first, if the premerger
custom was to employ a jury in such actions, second, if the litigants sought
an essentially legal remedy, and third, when the complexity of a case does
not exceed the practical abilities of a jury. ' 7 In Troy v. City of Hampton, 8
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether
the remedies provided in the VRA are essentially legal or equitable in nature,
and thus whether VRA claimants are entitled to trial by jury as specified in
the seventh amendment. 9
In Troy, veterans Johnny Blackmon and William Troy had taken leaves
of absence from employment in order to undertake reserve military training. 20
Blackmon brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, claiming that Blackmon's employer had violated
Section 2024(d) of the VRA by refusing to reemploy Blackmon following a
leave of absence for reserve military training. 2' Blackmon sought reinstate11. See supra note 9 (claimant may not bring suit in equity when adequate remedy exists
at law).
12. See J. MooRE, MOORE's F DERAL PRACTICE § 209(b) (2d ed. 1985) (discussing that
basic remaining distinction between actions of law or in equity is right to jury trial).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
16. See id. at 538 n.10 (discussing three part test to determine when claimants have right
to jury trial); infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (discussing Ross test).
17. Id. at 538 n.10. In Ross v. Bernhard, the United States Supreme Court held that
courts must consider three elements in jury trial inquiries. Id. First, courts must consider the
custom before merger of law and equity. Id. Second, courts must determine the nature of the
remedy sought. Id. Third, courts must examine the practical abilities of the jury. Id. The
Supreme Court based the Ross test on the rationale that courts should preserve and perpetuate
the respective jurisdictions of law and equity in the form in which law and equity existed in
1791 at the adoption of the seventh amendment. See Comment, The Seventh Amendment and
Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 506 (1973)
(discussing historical basis for Ross test); see also infra notes 85-124 and accompanying text
(discussing application of Ross test).
18. 756 F.2d 1000 (5-4 en banc decision) (4th Cir.), cert. denied, by Blackmon v. Observer
Transp. Co. -U.S.-,
106 S. Ct. 182 (1985).
19. 756 F.2d at 1001; see supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text (discussing importance
of distinction between legal and equitable actions to determination of whether seventh amendment right to jury trial exists).
20. 756 F.2d at 1001.
21. See id. (citing unpublished opinion of United States District Court for Western District
of North Carolina); supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of VRA).
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ment and backpay." The district court denied Blackmon's motion for a jury
trial, stating that the VRA provided equitable remedies triable only to the
court.2
Y- In the ensuing nonjury trial, the district court found for defendant,
Blackmon's former employer. 24 The district court held that the VRA did not
entitle Blackmon to reemployment because Blackmon failed to apply for a
leave of absence before departure, as required by Section 2024(d) of the
VRA. 25
Troy brought suit under Section 2024 of the VRA against the City of
Hampton, Virginia, in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia.2 6 The City of Hampton requested a nonjury trial, but
the district court denied the City's motion and conducted a jury trial. 27 Troy
requested reinstatement and backpay. 2 The subsequent jury trial resulted in
a jury verdict in favor of Troy. 29 The City of Hampton appealed to the
Fourth Circuit from the jury verdict in favor of Troy. a0 Blackmon appealed
to the Fourth Circuit from the nonjury verdict in favor of Blackmon's former
employer." The Fourth Circuit consolidated the City of Hampton's and
Blackmon's appeals in the present suit. 2 The Fourth Circuit in Troy held
that neither the United States Constitution nor the VRA provided a right to
jury trial for claimants under the VRA.33 The Troy court held that the
remedies of reinstatement and backpay provided in the VRA are equitable,
and thus not triable to a jury. 34 The Fourth Circuit in Troy, therefore,
affirmed the decision in Blackmon's nonjury trial and reversed and remanded
the decision in Troy's jury trial.3 5
22. 756 F.2d at 1001.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. (citing unpublished opinion of United States District Court for Eastern District
of Virginia). In Troy v. City of Hampton, the plaintiff, William Troy, applied for and received
a leave of absence for training in the Armed Forces Reserve. Id. Troy asserted that after
returning to Troy's employment with the City of Hampton, Virginia, the City of Hampton
wrongfully discharged Troy on the pretext of improper behavior. Id. Troy claimed that the City
of Hampton actually discharged Troy due to Troy's six month absence for reserve training. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The Troy court's consolidation of Troy's and Blackmon's separate actions into
one suit was proper under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.
(consolidating Troy's and Blackmon's separate actions); FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Rule 42 endows
federal judges with the authority to consolidate actions if the actions involve a common question
of law or fact. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a). See generally WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 97 (discussing
power of federal judges to consolidate separate actions).
33. Id.; see infra notes 67-124 and accompanying text (discussing whether constitution,
statutory language, or legislative history of VRA provide right to jury trial for VRA claimants).
34. See infra notes 67-124 and accompanying text (discussing whether VRA claimants
have right to jury trial).
35. 756 F.2d at 1001.
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In Troy, the Fourth Circuit first acknowledged that the VRA does not
discuss the question of jury trials. 36 The Troy court then noted that most
jurisdictions addressing the VRA jury trial question have held that the VRA
does not entitle claimants to jury trials because VRA remedies are equitable
in nature. 3" The Troy court rejected the view established in the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eighth Circuits that VRA claimants
seeking backpay enjoy a right to jury trial. 38 The Troy court recognized that
the United States District Court for the Western District of Iowa in Steffen
v. Farmer'sElevator Service Co., 39 and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in Gruca v. United States Steel40 had effectively held
that backpay under the VRA is legal in nature. The Troy court, however,
distinguished the holdings in Steffen and Gruca from the issues presented in
Troy.4' The Troy court observed that the Steffen claimant sought monetary
relief alone, a traditionally legal remedy. 42 In contrast, the Troy claimants
requested both reinstatement and backpay. 43 Consequently, the Troy court
reasoned that the Steffen holding did not apply to the Troy facts."4 The
36. Id.; see 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1982) (no indication of whether VRA claimants have
right to jury trial in VRA actions).
37. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Troy v. City of
Hampton, cited several cases in support of the court's statement that most jurisdictions consider
VRA remedies as essentially equitable in nature. Id.; see Bunnell v. New England Teamsters,
486 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Mass. 1980) (VRA remedies are equitable), aff'd, 655 F.2d 451 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982); Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 456 F.
Supp. 874, 876 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (same), aff'd, 606 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 913 (1980); Ufland v. Buffalo Courier Express, 394 F. Supp. 199, 201 (W.D.N.Y. 1974)
(same).
38. 756 F.2d at 1001-03; see infra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (discussing Troy
court's rationale for rejecting minority view that VRA claimants have right to jury trial); see
also infra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (analyzing Troy majority's rationale).
39. 109 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Iowa 1952).
40. 495 F.2d 1252 (3d Cir. 1974).
41. 756 F.2d at 1001-02; see infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (discussing Troy
court's interpretation of Steffen and Gruca).
42. 756 F.2d at 1001-02. See generally 1 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 62 (4th ed.
1918) (discussing distinction between legal and equitable remedies). In addition to noting that
Steffen held backpay to be a legal remedy, the Troy court stressed that Steffen held reinstatement
to be an equitable remedy. 756 F.2d at 1001. The Troy court further emphasized that the
claimant in Steffen requested monetary relief only. Id. (citing Steffen, 109 F. Supp. at 20). The
Steffen court considered a plea for monetary relief alone as a legal claim related to traditional
money damages. 109 F. Supp. at 20. Courts considering VRA claims that include pleas for
both backpay and reinstatement sometimes consider backpay as an element of the equitable
right to reinstatement. See Troy, 756 F.2d at 1003 (backpay is part of equitable reinstatement).
Poman v. General Dynamics Corp., 574 F. Supp. 147, 149 (D.R.I. 1983) (same); Cox v. City
of Kansas City, 76 F.R.D. 459, 459-60 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (same); Ufland v. Buffalo Courier
Express, 394 F. Supp. 199 at 200-01 (W.D.N.Y. 1974) (claim for backpay is element of VRA
claimant's equitable right to reinstatement).
43. 756 F.2d at 1001; see supra note 42 (discussing case precedent holding that backpay
is part of equitable remedy of reinstatement).
44. 756 F.2d at 1001-02; see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (explaining Troy
court's rationale for distinguishing Steffen).
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Fourth Circuit distinguished the Gruca holding on the ground that the Gruca
court did not consider whether backpay under the Military Selective Act
(MSSA), the effective precursor of the VRA, was a legal or equitable
remedy. 41 Instead, the Gruca court noted that because Congress had been
silent as to the method by which courts should determine timeliness under
the MSSA, courts should employ state statutes of limitations, rather than
46
the equitable doctrine of laches, in addressing MSSA claims.
In enacting the VRA in 1974, Congress embodied the MSSA's reemployment rights guarantees, by providing that veterans could seek relief under
the VRA when employers of those veterans violated the VRA.4 7 The MSSA
reemployment provisions did not specify whether the doctrine of laches or
state statutes of limitations applied in veterans' reemployment actions.4 8 In
1974 Congress amended the VRA's reemployment provisions.4 9 The 1974
VRA amendments provided, in pertinent part, that no state statutes of
limitations would apply in VRA actions. 0 The Troy court, therefore, suggested that the 1974 VRA amendments effectively made the Gruca holding
obsolete because Congress had provided expressly that the doctrine of laches
apply to VRA actions.5 ' Consequently, since the doctrine of laches is
traditionally characterized as an equitable doctrine, the Troy court reasoned
that remedies provided for in the VRA were equitable in nature.12 The Troy
court, therefore, concluded that VRA actions are equitable in nature and,
thus, not triable to a jury.53

45. 756 F.2d at 1002 (citing Gruca v. United States Steel, 495 F.2d 1252, 1256-57); see
supra note 1 (discussing MSSA as precursor of VRA's reemployment rights).
46. 756 F.2d at 1002 (citing Gruca v. United States Steel, 495 F.2d 1252, 1256-57); see 50
U.S.C. §§ 451 & 459 (repealed 1974).
47. 50 U.S.C. § 459 (repealed 1974); see supra note I (discussing MSSA a precursor of
VRA).
48. See Gruca, 495 F.2d at 1256-57 (MSSA did not specify which statute of limitations
applied in reemployment rights actions); 50 U.S.C. § 459 (repealed 1974).
49. See 38 U.S.C. § 2022 (amendments to VRA); infra note 50 (discussing 1974 VRA
amendments).
50. See S. REP. No. 93-907, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 111-12 (1974). The 1974 amendment to
§ 2022 of the VRA provided that courts toll time in VRA claims by the equitable doctrine of
laches, rather than by local statutes of limitations. Id.; see infra notes 78-84 and accompanying
text (discussing legislative intent for choosing laches rather than state statutes of limitations).
51. 756 F.2d at 1002; see S. REP. No. 93-907 at 111-12 (providing that doctrine of laches
applies in VRA claims).
52. 756 F.2d at 1002-03.
53. Id. The Troy court noted that Congress' intent in creating the 1974 amendments to
the VRA was to render VRA actions equitable in nature. Id. In particular, the Troy court relied
on specific language contained in the Senate Report of the Committee on Veterans. Id.; see S.
REP. No. 93-907, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 111-12 (1974). Senate Report 93-907 provides in pertinent
part that application of the equitable doctrine of laches to VRA actions promotes Congress'
policy that equitable principles of law govern legal proceedings brought under the VRA. S.
REP. No. 93-907 at 111-12. The Report further states that application of laches to VRA claims
promoted the congressional policy of keeping the enforcement rights available to returned
veterans as uniform as possible throughout the country. S. REP. No. 93-907 at 111-12; see infra
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Finally, the Troy court refused to adopt the view that VRA backpay is
legal in nature because the court reasoned that VRA backpay is most closely
analogous to backpay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.-4 The
Troy court pointed out that the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held consistently that Title VII backpay is an
equitable remedy.55 Therefore, since claimants requesting backpay under
Title VII did not enjoy a right to trial by jury under the seventh amendment,
the Troy court reasoned that claimants seeking reinstatement and backpay
under the VRA likewise did not enjoy a right to trial by jury. 5 ' The Troy
court supported the characterization of backpay as equitable by reasoning
that backpay constitutes an indispensable element of the equitable remedy
of reinstatement under the VRA.57
The dissent in Troy agreed with the majority's conclusion that the VRA
does not specifically provide VRA claimants with the right to jury trial. 8
Nevertheless, the dissent contended that the majority had neglected to apply
the controlling Supreme Court test to determine whether the Troy claimants
had a right to jury trial. 5 9 The Troy dissent urged a reexamination of the
Troy facts in light of the Supreme Court's tripartite test enunciated in Ross
v. Bernhard.60 In Ross, the Supreme Court created the standard to determine
when the seventh amendment right to jury trial attaches. 6' The dissent
asserted that proper application of the Ross test indicates that VRA claimants
have a right to trial by jury. 62 In addition, the dissent in Troy objected to

notes 78-83 and accompanying text (analyzing congressional intent in enacting the 1974 amendments to the VRA).
54. 756 F.2d at 1002 (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) (1982)); see infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text (comparing backpay awards under
various federal statutes).
55. 756 F.2d at 1002; see Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.)
(backpay under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 is equitable in nature), cert dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969) (backpay under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 is equitable in nature); see also
infra notes 110-15 and accompanying test (discussing Title VII backpay).
56. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing nature of Title VII backpay);
infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text (discussing jury trial issue in Title VII actions).
57. 756 F.2d at 1002; see infra notes 110-15 (discussing Troy court's analysis of Title VII
backpay).
58. 756 F.2d at 1004, (Ervin, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1005-06 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970)).
60. 756 F.2d at 1005-07 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10); See supra
notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing Ross test and applying Ross test in Troy); infra
notes 79-110 (discussing same).
61. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing Ross test).
62. See 756 F.2d at 1007-09. The Troy dissent reasoned that the Troy claimants satisfied
each of the three prongs of the Ross test. Id.; see also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying
text (discussing Ross test). First, the Troy dissent asserted that VRA claims are analogous to
claims that litigants pressed in law courts rather than in equity courts prior to the merger of
law and equity. 756 F.2d at 1007; see also infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text (discussing
common-law analogs to VRA claims). Second, the Troy dissent reasoned that VRA backpay is
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the majority's interpretation of the VRA's legislative history. 63 The dissent
recognized that the 1974 amendments to the VRA provided that the equitable
doctrine of laches, in contradistinction to state statutes of limitations, govern
questions of timeliness in actions brought under the VRA. 64 The dissent,
however, suggested that in choosing to apply laches, Congress merely intended to promote uniformity in the vindication of veterans' rights nationwide, rather than permitting differences in state statutes of limitations to
create inequitable treatment.', According to the dissent, therefore, the majority incorrectly interpreted the laches provision as a congressional charac66
terization of VRA actions as essentially equitable in nature.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not considered the VRA
jury trial issue, the Court generally has not found a seventh amendment
right to jury trial in other statutory schemes that provide reinstatement and
backpay remedies. 67 Furthermore, most jurisdictions that have considered
whether VRA remedies are legal or equitable have concluded that VRA
backpay, like reinstatement, is equitable in nature. 68 In most jurisdictions,
therefore, the seventh amendment does not entitle VRA claimants to jury
0
trial.6 9 For example, in Ufland v. Buffalo Courier Express,"
the United
States District Court for the Western District of New York held that a
legal in nature because courts have little discretion over when courts must award backpay under
§ 2022 of the VRA. 756 F.2d at 1008; see also infra notes 105-22 and accompanying text
(discussing significance of court discretion in assessing whether backpay is equitable or legal).
Third, the Troy dissent suggested that VRA claims are not overly complex for the practical
abilities of civil juries. 756 F.2d at 1009.
63. 756 F.2d at 1008-09.
64, Id.
65. Id. (citing S. Rap. No. 93-907, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 111-12 (1974); see supra note 50
(discussing contents of S. Rep. 93-907 on subject of laches); see also infra notes 77-84 and
accompanying text (analyzing legislative intent of 1974 amendments to VRA).
66. 756 F.2d at 1009.
67. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974). In Curtis v. Loether, the United
States Supreme Court considered whether the seventh amendment right to jury trial attaches in
claims under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 190-91 (citing 42
U.S.C. 3612(c) (1970)). Section 3612 of Title VIII permits private plaintiffs to sue alleged
violators of the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at
190-91 (citing 42 U.S.C. 3612 (1970)). The Supreme Court in Curtis held that the monetary
relief that courts may award under Title VIII is legal in nature because § 3612(b) invests courts
with little discretion as to whether to award monetary relief. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197. In effect,
if a Title VIII claimant proves a violation of the fair housing provisions, the courts must award
monetary compensation. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197. The Curtis court, therefore, held that the
seventh amendment entitles Title VIII claimants to jury trials. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198; see infra
notes 108-22 and accompanying text (comparing Title VIII monetary relief with monetary relief
under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
and the VRA).
68. See supra note 42 (citing case precedent supporting proposition that VRA backpay is
equitable because backpay is indispensable element of equitable remedy of reinstatement); see
also infra notes 118-24 (discussing equitable nature of VRA remedies).
69. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that backpay
under VRA is equitable in nature).
70. 394 F. Supp. 199 (W.D. N.Y. 1974).
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veteran's claim for backpay under the VRA was a component of the veteran's
right to reinstatement into his former position with all attendant benefits. 7'
The district court in Ufland, therefore, held that a veteran's claim for
backpay under the VRA is equitable in nature. 72 Similarly, in Pomon v.
General Dynamics Corp.,73 the United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island held that in the VRA, Congress created a federal cause of
action that was entirely equitable in nature. 74 The Pomon court, therefore,
held that the seventh amendment does not entitle VRA claimants to trial by
75
jury.
Case precedent, therefore, supports the Troy court's holding. 75 An
analysis of the Troy majority's reasoning, however, indicates some potential
weaknesses. 77 The Troy majority concluded that Congress' preference in the
VRA for the use of laches instead of state statutes of limitations required a
finding that VRA actions are equitable in nature and, consequently, that
VRA claimants have no right to jury trial.7 8 As the Troy dissent noted,
however, the majority's conclusion is questionable. 79 The Troy dissent indicated that the report of the Senate Committee on Veterans regarding the
1974 VRA amendments explains that Congress chose laches over state statutes
of limitations only to ensure that veterans in all states had uniform opportunities to bring, claims under the VRA. s0 Congress, therefore, did not
necessarily intend the 1974 amendments to affect the manner in which courts
adjudicate VRA claims after a VRA claimant institutes a VRA suit.8'
Consequently, Congress probably did not express a desire to prevent a VRA2
claimant seeking reinstatement and backpay from obtaining trial by jury.
Rather, Congress merely attempted to avoid the potentially unjust results
that would follow from the application of vastly divergent state statutes of
limitations to causes of action arising under a single federal statute. 3 Thus,
to the extent that the Troy majority relied on erroneous interpretation of

71. Id. at 200-01.
72. Id.

73. 574 F. Supp. 147 (D.R.I. 1983).
74. Id. at 149.
75. Id.

76. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (discussing support for Troy majority's
holding that VRA claimants do not have right to jury trial).
77. See infra notes 78-102 and accompanying text (discussing possible weaknesses in Troy
majority's reasoning).
78. 756 F.2d at 1002-03; see S. REP. No. 93-907, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 111-12 (1974);
supranotes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing Troy majority's interpretation of legislative
history of 1974 amendments to VRA).
79. 756 F.2d at 1009; see infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing Troy
dissent's criticism of Troy majority's interpretation of legislative history of 1974 VRA amendments).
80. 756 F.2d at 1009; see S. REP. No. 93-907, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 111-12 (1974).
81. 756 F.2d at 1009.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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legislative intent, the dissent's recognition that courts should not deny jury
trials to VRA claimants solely on the84 basis of the laches provision of the
1974 VRA amendments is persuasive.
A second weakness in the Troy majority's reasoning is the court's failure
to apply the Ross test to the VRA jury trial question.8 5 The Troy dissent
correctly noted that the Supreme Court created a three part test to determine
whether the seventh amendment right to jury trial attaches in a particular
action. 86 The Troy majority, therefore, should have applied the Ross test to
determine whether the seventh amendment right to jury trial attaches in VRA
claims.8 7 The Troy dissent applied the Ross test to the Troy facts and
concluded that the seventh amendment entitled the VRA claimants in Troy
to jury trials. 81 The Troy dissent's Ross analysis was correct as to the first
and third prongs of the Ross test. 9 The dissent's incorrect application of
Ross' second prong, however, renders invalid the dissent's conclusion that
the seventh amendment right to jury trial attaches in VRA actions. 90
In applying the Ross test, the Troy dissent properly noted that the United
States Supreme Court has held that the seventh amendment applies to
statutory causes of action. 9' The first prong of the Ross test requires courts
to determine whether the claim is one which, before the merger of law and
equity, litigants would have pursued in a law court or in chancery. 92 The
dissent in Troy acknowledged that most courts considering the VRA jury
trial issue have labeled VRA backpay as an indispensable element of the
equitable remedy of reinstatement."' In applying the first prong of Ross, the
Troy dissent examined several actions arising before the merger of law and
equity that were analogous to VRA claims. 94 Before the merger of law and

84. Id.
85. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of Ross v.
Bernhard jury trial test to Troy); see also Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10 (discussing three part test
to determine when claimants have right to jury trial).
86. See 756 F.2d at 1005-07 (Troy dissent argues that Troy majority should have applied
Ross test in Troy).
87. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing jury trial test that Supreme
Court set forth in Ross v. Bernhard); see also Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10 (discussing three part
test to determine when claimants have right to jury trial).
88. 756 F.2d at 1007-09; see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing Troy
dissent's application of Ross test to Troy facts).
89. See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text (discussing Troy dissent's correct
application of prongs one and. three of Ross test).
90. See infra notes 105-24 and accompanying text (analyzing Troy dissent's incorrect
application of second prong of Ross test in Troy).
91. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1979) (Supreme Court often has held that
seventh amendment applies to statutory causes of action).
92. Ross, 396 U.S. at 438 n.10; see supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (discussing
1938 merger of law and equity into one form of civil action under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
93. 756 F.2d at 1007; see supra note 37 (citing case precedent to support proposition that
most jurisdictions hold that VRA actions are equitable).
94. 756 F.2d at 1007. The Troy dissent relied heavily on the historical analysis in Ochoa
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equity, these analogous actions were triable in courts of law rather than in
chancery. 95 For example, the dissent noted that VRA actions are analogous

to wrongfully discharged servant actions.9 6 At common law, wrongfully
discharged servants had the right to bring suit in the law courts requesting

the practical equivalent of backpay, the remainder of wages owed for the
97
balance of the contractual work period following the wrongful discharge.
Alternatively, wrongfully discharged servants could bring suit for breach of

contract in law courts, rather than in chancery. 9 Applying the first element
of the Ross test, 99 the dissent concluded that VRA claims are analogous to
claims which, at common law, would have been triable not in equity but as

traditionally legal causes of action.' °° In addition, the third prong of Ross

requires courts to consider whether in practical terms a case is too complex
v. American Oil Co. to support the conclusion that statutory claims for backpay are analogous
to certain forms of action at common law. See 756 F.2d at 1007-08, (citing Ochoa v. American
Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 918 (S.D. Tex. 1972)); infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text
(discussing common-law analogs to claims brought under VRA). See also Thomas v. Resort
Health Related Facility, 539 F. Supp. 630, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing Ochoa court's analysis
of common-law analogs to statutory backpay actions); Cook v. Cox, 357 F. Supp. 120, 124
(E.D. Va. 1973) (same).
95. See Ochoa, 338 F. Supp. at 918 (describing common law analogs to claims for backpay
under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964). In Ochoa, plaintiffs were discharged employees
who claimed their employer engaged in employment practices in violation of section 2000(e) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Ochoa, 338 F. Supp. at 915; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)
(Civil Rights Act of 1964) (prohibiting discrimination in employment based on race, color,
religion, sex or national origin). The Ochoa plaintiffs demanded a jury trial. Ochoa, 338 F.
Supp. at 915. The Ochoa court, in applying the Ross jury trial test, noted that statutory claims
for backpay were analogous to several types of actions which at common law were legal in
nature. Id. at 918. The Ochoa court concluded that courts should grant jury trials to Title VII
claimants since Title VII claimants apparently satisfied all three prongs of the Ross test. Id. at
923. Nevertheless, the Ochoa court reluctantly followed case precedent and refused to grant the
plaintiff's request for jury trial. Id. Citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., the
Ochoa court held that Title VII claimants do not have a right to jury trial under the seventh
amendment. Ochoa, 338 F. Supp. at 923; see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) (no right to jury trial in Title VII actions).
96. See Ochoa, 338 F. Supp. at 918. The Ochoa court reasoned that statutory claims for
backpay are analogous to the common-law action of indebitatus assumpsit, which provided a
remedy for a wrongfully dicharged servant. Id. The Ochoa court reasoned that a wrongfully
discharged servant's suit for the remainder of wages which accrued after wrongful discharge is
similar to modern suits for backpay. Id. The action of indebitatus assumpsit was triable to a
court of law, as opposed to a chancellor in equity. Id. The Ochoa court, therefore, believed
that courts should grant jury trials in Title VII actions for backpay. Id. But see supra note 95
(discussing Ochoa court's ultimate decision to deny jury trial).
97. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing action at common law for
wrongful discharge).
98. See Ochoa, 338 F. Supp. at 918 (wrongfully discharged servant has cause of action at
law, rather than in equity, for breach of contract).
99. See Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n. 10 (first prong of Ross test requires court to consider
premerger custom for similar cases).
100. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (discussing common-law analogs to
modern statutory claims for backpay).
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for the practical abilities of a jury.'0' The dissent properly asserted that juries
are fully capable of considering VRA claims. 0 2
Consequently, proper application of Ross'03 supports the Troy dissent's
analysis of the Troy facts, in light of prongs one and three of the Ross
test.'04 Nevertheless, the dissent's application of the remaining element of
Ross is questionable.0 5 Ross requires courts to examine the nature of the

remedy which the claimant has requested.'0 6 In Curtis v. Loether,0 7 the
United States Supreme Court recognized that, in determining whether any
kind of monetary relief constitutes a remedy at law or in equity, courts have

considered that the amount of discretion with which the statute invests the

court is an important factor. 08 In Curtis, the Supreme Court held that in
suits brought under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, monetary
awards are legal in nature because the statute invests the court with no
discretionary power as to whether to include or exclude money damages in
the remedy.109 Once a plaintiff has proved that the defendant has violated

101. See Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10 (third prong of jury trial test requires court to consider
practical abilites of jury).
102. See Troy, 756 F.2d at 1009 (jury is capable of hearing VRA claims). As the Troy
dissent correctly asserted, VRA claims do not resemble the types of actions that courts consider
overly complex for jury consideration. See 756 F.2d at 1009 (Ervin, J., dissenting) (Dissent in
Troy argues that VRA claims are not too complex for jury trial). The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York's holding in Bernstein v. UniversalPictures, Inc.
is an example of the operation of the complexity exception to the seventh amendment right to
jury trial. See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In
Bernstein, the district court denied the plaintiffs' jury trial demand because the court believed
that consideration of 1200 exhibits, 70 depositions, and 2500 pages of highly complex accountants' worksheets was beyond the capabilities of a civil jury. 79 F.R.D. at 62-63. See generally
Rodiger, Has the Right to Jury Trial as Guaranteed Under the Seventh Amendment Become
Outdated in Complex Civil Litigation?, 8 PEPPERDmiE L. Rav. 189 (1980) (arguing that courts
should conduct jury trials even in complex litigation).
103. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text (discussing Troy dissent's application
to Troy facts of prongs one and three of Ross test).
104. See Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10 (first prong of Ross test requires court to examine
premerger custom, while third prong of Ross test inquires into practical abilities of jury).
105. See infra notes 106-24 (discussing application of second prong of Ross test to Troy).
106. See Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10 (second prong of Ross test requires examination of
nature of remedy sought).
107. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
108. Id. at 197; see supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing Curtis holding
that amount of discretion invested in court is factor in determining nature of remedy). In
Albemarle Paper v. Moody, the United States Supreme Court reiterated and explained the
importance of judicial discretion in determining whether a remedy is equitable or legal in nature.
Albemarle Paper v. Moody, 422 U S. 405, 443 (1975). The Albemarle Court explained that
when an award must follow if a claimant proved a violation, the remedy is legal in nature.
Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 443. If, however, the court has discretion as to whether to make an
award, then the remedy is equitable in nature. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 443.
109. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197; see Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3061, 3612(c)
(1982) (fair housing provision).
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Title VIII fair housing guarantees, Title VIII entitles the plaintiff to money
damages in the amount of damage proven as a matter of law." 0
In contrast, courts consistently have considered monetary awards of
backpay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 equitable in nature
because Title VII invests courts with great discretion to determine appropriate
remedies."' Under section 2000e-5(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 courts
may enjoin employers from engaging in unlawful employment practices and
order any other appropriate action including, but not limited to, reinstatement, backpay or any other equitable relief deemed appropriate." 2 Inherent
in Title VII's broad grant of discretion is the court's duty to consider
equitable principles in evaluating the proper remedy for a specific case.
As a final analogy, backpay awarded under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967" a is legal in nature because Section 626b
of the ADEA incorporates the command of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)." 4 The FLSA provides that employers who violate the FLSA, and
by incorporation the ADEA, shall be liable for backpay.11 Unlike Title VII's
broad grant of discretion, the ADEA grants courts no discretion in shaping
remedies in ADEA suits." 6 Consequently, ADEA remedies, like Title VIII
remedies, are legal in nature. '1
In comparing the VRA with Title VII, Title VIII, and the ADEA, the
Troy majority properly concluded that the VRA's grant of discretion is most
similar to the broad discretion accorded to courts under Title VII.11 Section
2022 of the VRA merely grants federal district courts the power to require
violators to comply with the VRA, and to compensate the veteran for wages
lost as a result of the violation.' 9 Unlike the ADEA, the VRA does not
command that the violator shall be liable for monetary compensation if the
110. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197; see Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982) (violators of Title
VIII are liable for money damages).
111. See Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1151-52 (10th Cir. 1976) (Title VII
backpay is equitable); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975) (no right to jury
trial under Title VII because Title VII backpay is equitable in nature); Williams v. General
Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 407 (7th Cir. 1974) (Title VII backpay is equitable); Robinson v.
Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.) (Title VII claims not triable to jury because Title VII
backpay is equitable), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) (same); see also supra text accompanying
note 110 (discussing discretionary nature of Title VIII backpay awards).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1982).
114. Id. § 216 (1982).
115. See id. Section 216 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides in pertinent
part that employers who violate the FLSA shall be liable for backpay. Id.
116. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978) (ADEA claimants have right to jury
trial); Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 (4th Cir. 1980) (ADEA claimants entitled to jury
trial); Harris v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 489 F. Supp. 476, 479 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (public
employees who bring ADEA claims entitled to jury trial).
117. See supra notes 113-16 (discussing legal nature of ADEA claims).
118. 756 F.2d at 1002.
119. 38 U.S.C. § 2022 (1982).
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claimant has proved a violation. 20 Rather, as in Title VII, the VRA grants
to courts the power to shape appropriate remedies. 2 Since the VRA invests
courts with great discretion in fashioning remedies, application of Ross and
Curtis suggests that VRA remedies are equitable in nature. 22 The Troy
majority did not expressly apply the Ross test.' 23 Nevertheless, the Troy
majority's conclusion that the seventh amendment right to jury trial does
not attach in equitable VRA actions is entirely consistent with a proper
24
analysis of the Troy facts in light of the Ross standard.
25
Neither case precedent
nor application of the Ross test,' 26 however,
supports the dissent's assertion that the VRA entitles VRA claimants to jury
trials. While acknowledging contrary case precedent, the Troy dissent, nevertheless, suggests that the seventh amendment and a strong historical tradition
may support liberal granting of jury trials. 127 The jury trial issue is particularly
important in statutory cases. Congress may certainly indicate through express
statutory language that courts should consider the rights and remedies which
a statute creates as equitable in nature. Furthermore, legislatures, as well as
the judiciary, may want to avoid the possibility that juror bias might interfere
with the proper functioning of a statute dealing with controversial issues. 28

120. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (discussing legal nature of ADEA
claims).
121. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text (discussing jury trial under Title VII
and VRA).
122. See supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text (under second prong of Ross test
remedies are equitable when statute grants court great discretion in shaping a remedy).
123. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing Troy court's failure to apply
Ross test).
124. See supra notes 105-123 and accompanying text (discussing how application of second
prong of Ross test indicates Troy court correctly held that VRA remedies are equitable).
125. See supra note 37 (citing case precedent supporting denial of jury trial in VRA claims).
126. See supra notes 91-124 and accompanying text (discussing application of Ross jury
trial test to Troy).
127. See 756 F.2d at 1004-05. The Troy dissent noted that Thomas Jefferson believed that
the jury trial provided the most effective means through which the people can compel the
government to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. Id.; see also 3 Writings of
Thomas Jefferson 71 (1979) (jury trial serves as check on government power and thus compels
government to follow constitution principles). Pronouncements by the Supreme Court have
reinforced the importance of jury trials to democratic government. See Sioux City & Pac. R.R.
v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1884) (practical experience of 12 jurors is invaluable in
providing wise conclusions from facts in lawsuits); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)
(court should give great weight to importance of function of jury in evaluating challenges to
jury trial); Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (historical presumption towards trial by
jury is of lasting importance).
128. See Comment, supra note 17, at 538. In addition to questions of jury bias, another
element courts should consider in defining the proper role of the seventh amendment is the
desirability of creating a consistent body of law for new statutorily created rights through
employment of nonjury trials. See id. at 538 (discussing need for initial development of uniform
body of law under new statutory cause of action). Although juries are officially admonished to
consider only properly admitted trial evidence and testimony and to apply the law as embodied
in the judge's charge, jurors often base decisions on other factors. See Sonaike, The Influence
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To allow Congress unlimited authority to characterize statutory rights as
legal or equitable, however, would essentially endow Congress with the
power to legislate away the seventh amendment right to jury trial.' 29 The
judiciary, through application of the Ross test, then, serves as a check on
Congress' power to expand the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts.
In Troy, the Fourth Circuit adhered to prevailing case authority in
holding that the seventh amendment right to jury trial does not attach in
claims brought under the VRA.'3 0 Although the Troy court failed to apply
the controlling Ross test,' the court's conclusion is entirely consistent with
a correct Ross analysis.'1 2 Considered more broadly, the Troy opinion
highlights for Fourth Circuit attorneys important questions about the role
of the seventh amendment in statutorily created rights and remedies.' 33 When
the language of a federal statute does not provide expressly for jury trial,
the Troy majority suggests that federal courts should examine the legislative
history surrounding the federal statute.'3 4 The dissent in Troy, however,
suggests that Fourth Circuit attorneys should weigh the import of such
legislative history against the Ross standard and the traditional presumption
in favor of jury trial in arguing for or against the right to jury trial under a
3
particular federal statute.'
ANNE ELIZABETH SCHMELZER

of Jury Deliberation on Juror Perception of Trial, Credibility and Damage Awards, 1978
B.Y.U.L. REv. 889, 889-90 (1978) (discussing "unofficial" facts that juries wrongly consider in
the decisionmaking process).
129. See Comment, supra note 17, at 533 (Congress should not have absolute authority to
characterize actions as equitable).
130. See supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing Fourth
Circuit's holding in Troy).
131. See supra notes 85-124 (discussing Troy majority's failure to apply the Ross test); see
also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing Ross test).
132. See supra notes 85-124 (discussing analysis of Troy under Ross test).
133. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations in
defining role of seventh amendment).
134. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing Troy majority's analysis of
VRA's legislative history). But see supra notes 58-66, 79-84, and accompanying text (discussing
Troy dissent's criticism of Troy majority's interpretation of VRA's legislative history).
135. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing policy goals courts should
consider in decisions to grant or deny jury trials under the seventh amendment).

